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INTRODUCTION

Recent years have seen a proliferation of governmental public nuisance
litigation. The latest targets of such lawsuits have been manufacturers and
distributors of opioid pain medication. Many of these suits, like those brought
in the mid-1990s against the stalwarts of the tobacco industry, are filed by
state Attorneys General to recover for harms ostensibly suffered by the
citizens of the state. In a crucial development, however, a number of local
governments have filed parallel lawsuits against opioid manufacturers and
distributors, asserting public nuisance claims and seeking to recover for
alleged injuries suffered by the local governments themselves.
This most recent wave of governmental public nuisance litigation is but a
continuation of a two-decade trend in which local governments have sought
to expand on the traditional scope of the public nuisance cause of action in
hopes of recovering from deep-pocketed defendants in a variety of industries.
The evolution of the public nuisance claim, however, has been fraught with
difficulties, and in many instances, has been rebuffed by the courts. In
addition, such public nuisance lawsuits are in many instances merely a clumsy
way of resolving what is, at bottom, a policy question. Furthermore, such
lawsuits disrupt the justice system's ability to justly and efficiently resolve the
claims of those who have, in fact, actually been injured by the products or
conduct at issue.
Part II of this Article summarizes a history of local government's use of
public nuisance litigation. Part III explains that, for a variety of reasons, such
lawsuits are an improper, or at best, ill-suited forum in which to address
certain topics that necessarily involve the resolution of policy-type questions.
Part IV further explains how such lawsuits disrupt the ability of states'
Attorneys General to bring and manage litigation involving the same alleged
conduct. Finally, Part V argues public nuisance suits brought by local
governments have a negative effect on the effective and equitable functioning
of the justice system.
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PUBLIC NUISANCE

Over the past 226 years,' the cause of action for public nuisance has
evolved from a criminal remedy primarily employed to protect and preserve
the rights and property shared by the public generally into a common law tort
that has increasingly gained favor as a tool by which local governments
attempt to galvanize popular opinion or to effect changes the locality was
unable to achieve through its geographically limited legislative authority. As
explained more fully below, this evolution has quickened in recent decades
and continues apace in the form of hundreds of municipal public nuisance
suits recently brought against makers and distributors of pharmaceutical
drugs.
A.

The Origins and Evolution ofPublic Nuisance Litigation

From its earliest use at the founding of the Republic, the term "public
nuisance" has referred to conduct or a condition that interferes with or impairs
2
a public right a right commonly held by all members of the general public.
At its inception, the common law action for public nuisance was exclusively
a criminal remedy, and the prosecution of such claims was reserved for state
or government officials seeking injunctive relief or criminal conviction for
harms to the public.3 As the doctrine developed at common law, it was

1.
The claim of public nuisance has been recognized in American jurisprudence since at
least 1792, see Burrows v. Pixley, 1 Root 362, 362 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1792), and, prior to that,
was a known aspect of English common law in use in America. See Donald G. Gifford, Public

Nuisance as a Mass ProductsLiability Tort, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 741, 800 (2003) ("As was the
case with many aspects of the common law, the English law of public nuisance, or common
nuisance, was adopted without significant change in colonial America and subsequently in the
new republic during its early years.").
2.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see also
Gifford, supra note 1, at 800 ("The early American cases of what would now be regarded as
public nuisance fell into two categories. Most public nuisance actions involved the obstruction
of either public highways or navigable waterways.").
3.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. a; see also Gifford, supra note
1, at 814. Even today, though the doctrine of public nuisance has broadened somewhat, vestiges
of this limitation remain, and a private individual may only bring a cause of action for public
nuisance if he can show some special injury, unique from that suffered by the rest of the general
public. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 82 1C(a); see also, e.g., Ileto v. Glock Inc.,

349 F.3d 1191, 1212 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding gunshot victims' public nuisance claim on basis
of special injury); NAACP v. AcuSport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 499 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)
(dismissing public nuisance claim brought by civil rights organization after finding that the harm
suffered by the African-American community in the state of New York was the same as the
injury to the rest of the public).
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expanded to cover a wide-ranging class of minor criminal offenses, essentially
applying to any interference with the interest of the general population.4
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, these interests included
public health, safety, morals, peace, comfort, and convenience:
[I]nterference with the public health, as in the case of keeping
diseased animals or the maintenance of a pond breeding malarial
mosquitoes; with the public safety, as in the case of the storage of
explosives in the midst of a city or the shooting of fireworks in the
public streets; with the public morals, as in the case of houses of
prostitution or indecent exhibitions; with the public peace, as by loud
and disturbing noises, with the public comfort, as in the case of
widely disseminated bad odors, dust and smoke; with the public
convenience, as by the obstruction of a public highway or a navigable
stream; and with a wide variety of other miscellaneous public rights
of a similar kind.5
As states began codifying criminal statutes and moving away from
common law crimes, courts recognized that, given the unreasonableness of
acts traditionally recognized as a public nuisance crime, such activities would
also constitute a tort.6 Today, the common law tort of public nuisance is far
more prevalent than the common law crime, although the original tests for
determining when a public nuisance arises and who may bring such claims
remain applicable. 7
As the nature of the public nuisance claim has evolved, so has the way in
which the claim is used.8 Over the last century, municipalities and
governmental subdivisions have increasingly turned to public nuisance claims
as a means of protesting or effecting change in pressing policy issues. Local
governments have done so in a variety of suits relating to gun violence,
climate change, and subprime lending practices. These suits-and the mixed
results they have met-are described more fully below.

4.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 82 1B cmt. b.
5.
Id.
6.
See id.
7.
See id.
8.
See generally Richard C. Ausness, Public Tort Litigation: Public Benefit or Public
Nuisance?,77 TEMP. L. REV. 825, 869-70 (2004) (noting the use of public nuisance as a liability
theory for government plaintiffs); Raymond H. Brescia, On PublicPlaintiffsandPrivateHarms:
The Standing of Municipalities in Climate Change, Firearms, andFinancial Crisis Litigation,
24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 7, 8 (2010) (recognizing municipal plaintiffs as the
parties most often asserting public nuisance claims).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol70/iss3/3
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MunicipalSuits Against FirearmsManufacturers

In the late 1990s into the early 2000s, numerous municipalities brought
actions against handgun manufacturers, seeking to recover costs arising from
gun violence. 9 The outcomes of such lawsuits-and the States' legislative
responses to them have been mixed.' 0
For example, some state legislatures-like Louisiana's have enacted
laws prohibiting municipalities from bringing such claims against gun
manufacturers." Louisiana's statute was enacted shortly after the City of New
Orleans filed the first suit of this kind in 1998 against fifteen gun
manufacturers, five local pawnshops, and three firearms trade associations.12
Subsequently, the Louisiana legislature passed another statute declaring that
the manufacturing of firearms is not "unreasonably dangerous." 3 In 2001, the
Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the statute, effectively mooting the City's
lawsuit.' 4 Similarly, the Georgia legislature enacted a statute prohibiting any
government entity other than the state of Georgia itself from bringing actions
against gun manufacturers and distributors only five days after the City of
Atlanta filed a public nuisance action. 15
Of the municipal suits that proceeded through the litigation process,
courts have often ruled in favor of the defendant gun manufacturers.1 6 For
example, only a few weeks after the City of New Orleans filed its later-mooted
lawsuit, the City of Chicago followed suit, bringing claims against multiple
arms manufacturers and retailers alleging the defendants knowingly and
willfully facilitated the use, transport, and sale of firearms in violation of

9.
See generally Ausness, supra note 8, at 840-53 (summarizing a dozen local
governments' lawsuits, including some alleging public nuisance causes of action, against
firearms manufacturers seeking to recover the costs of municipal expenses allegedly related to
gun violence); Brescia, supra note 8, at 12-20 (same); Doug Morgan, Comment, What in the
Wide, Wide World of Torts Is Going On? First Tobacco, Now Guns: An Examination of
Hamilton v. Accu-Tek and the Cities' Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry, 69 MIss. L.J. 521
(1999) (analyzing a 1999 verdict in the Eastern District of New York against fifteen arms
manufacturers and commenting on the recent surge in similar lawsuits).
10. See generally Ausness, supra note 8, at 871-73 (describing courts' differing views
on whether to expand the traditional scope of public nuisance law to encompass municipal
claims against product manufacturers).
11. LA.STAT.ANN. §40:1799 (2001).
12.

See Brent W. Landau, Note, State Bans on City Gun Lawsuits, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.

623, 624-25 (2000); see Morgan, supra note 9, at 528-29.
13. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.60 (Supp. 2005).
14. Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 785 So. 2d 1, 19 (La. 2001).
15. Smith & Wesson Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 543 S.E.2d 16, 18 (Ga. 2001) (footnote
omitted); see also GA. CODE ANN.

16.

§

16-11-184.

See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1126 (Ill. 2004).
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Chicago's gun laws and enabled the growth of the black market for illegal
guns in the city. 17 The trial court dismissed the lawsuit, and the Illinois
Supreme Court affirmed, holding there was no public right of freedom from
the threat of illegal conduct." Moreover, the court held that gun
manufacturers and retailers were engaged in a lawful business such that, even
if a public right did exist, it had suffered no unreasonable interference due to
defendants' conduct.' 9 Likewise, the Connecticut Supreme Court and the
Florida Court of Appeals rejected similar claims by the City of Bridgeport,
Connecticut and Miami-Dade County, Florida against gun manufacturers and
distributors. 20

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also held that
under New Jersey state law, public nuisance claims are not permitted "against
manufacturers for lawful products that are lawfully placed in the stream of
commerce." 2' Furthermore, the Third Circuit recognized that "courts have
enforced the boundary between the well-developed body of product liability
law and public nuisance law," and "if public nuisance law were permitted to
encompass product liability, nuisance law 'would become a monster that
would devour in one gulp the entire law of tort. "'22 The following year, the
Third Circuit reaffirmed its decision under Pennsylvania law, holding that
"public nuisance is a matter of state law," and "Pennsylvania precedent does
not support the public nuisance claim [the City of Philadelphia] advance[s]
here . . . ."23 The court also noted that "the causal chain is too attenuated to
make out a public nuisance claim" because "the gun manufacturers do not

17. Morgan, supra note 9, at 530-32.
18. City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. 98 CH 15596, 2000 WL 35509506 (Ill.
Cir. Ct. Sept. 15, 2000) (dismissing City of Chicago's complaint); see City of Chicago, 821
N.E.2d at 1126.
19. City of Chicago, 821 N.E.2dat 1121-27.
20. Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 122 (Conn. 2001) (holding that the
city could not recover purely economic losses arising from gun-related injuries to city residents);
Penelas v. Arms Tech. Inc., 778 So. 2d 1042, 1045 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (refusing to hold
that the defendants' actions constituted a public nuisance and recognizing that the County's
claims were merely "an attempt to regulate firearms and ammunition through the medium of the
judiciary . . because of the County's frustration at its inability to directly regulate firearms, an
exercise proscribed by section 790.33, Florida Statutes (1999), which expressly preempts to the
state legislature the entire field of firearm and ammunition regulation").
21. Camden Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536, 540
(3d Cir. 2001).
22. Id. at 540 (quoting Tioga Pub. Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915, 921 (8th
Cir. 1993)).
23. City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 421 (3rd Cir. 2002).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol70/iss3/3
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exercise significant control over the source of the interference with the public
right." 24

On the other hand, some courts have permitted these actions to proceed
to trial. 25 For instance, the Ohio Supreme Court in a 4-3 opinion-adopted
a broad definition of public nuisance, holding that an "action can be
maintained for injuries caused by a product if the facts establish that the
design, manufacturing, marketing, or sale of the product unreasonably
interferes with a right common to the general public." 26 The court rejected the
defendants' argument that their lack of control over the firearms at the time of
the injury was fatal to the public nuisance claim.27 Instead, the court held that
the creation of and supplying to an illegal firearm market as a result of
defendants' alleged "ongoing conduct of marketing, distributing, and selling
firearms in a manner that facilitated their flow into the illegal market" would
constitute a viable public nuisance claim and reinstated the lawsuit.28 Both the
Supreme Court of Indiana and the Appellate Division of the New Jersey
Superior Court have likewise held that a public nuisance claim can stand even
where the defendant was not engaged in any unlawful activity. 29
2.

Municipal Suits Against Oil ProducersRelating to Climate
Change

Another area in which local governments have sought to expand the
traditional bounds of public nuisance claims involves suits against oil
producers for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of climate change. The
Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have declined to opine whether
municipalities have standing to bring such suits, holding instead that such
claims were impermissible because the federal common law upon which they

24. Id. at 422.
25. See, e.g., White v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 816, 829 (N.D. Ohio 2000)
(holding that the City of Cleveland's public nuisance claim survived defendants' motion to
dismiss because the claim would be allowable if the city could prove that defendants were
negligently creating or enabling the nuisance conditions).

26. City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1142 (Ohio 2002).
27. Id. at 1143.
28. Id. at 1143-44.
29. City of Gary ex rel. King v. Smith& Wesson Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1232-33 (Ind.
2003); James v. Arms Tech., 820 A.2d 27, 50-53 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (upholding
City of Newark's public nuisance claim based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts definition
of "public nuisance" as not requiring interference with property or "conduct that is proscribed
by a statute, ordinance or administrative regulation").
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were based had been "displaced" by federal statutory law, and two recent
district court rulings have dismissed similar lawsuits for other reasons.3 0
The historic backdrop against which such lawsuits are assessed dates back
to the Supreme Court's 2007 opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA, 3 1 holding the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts had standing to sue the United States
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") challenging the EPA's failure to
enact regulations under the Clean Air Act pertaining to specific pollutants. 32
The Supreme Court held Massachusetts had standing both as a sovereign
state33 and as an owner of property affected by rising water levels allegedly
caused by global warming.3 4 The Court further grounded its holding on the
fact that Congress had expressly authorized suits challenging the EPA's
failure to enact regulations under the Clean Air Act, which thus provided a
"procedural right" to ensure the EPA's enforcement of the Act.3 5
In the wake of the Court's holding in Massachusetts v. EPA, litigants
began attempting to expand the application of that holding to other claims and
settings.3 6 The first global warming cases based on a public nuisance claim
were filed by the City of New York, eight states and three land trusts in 2004
in the Southern District of New York.3 7 The plaintiffs sued five major electric
power companies that owned and operated fossil-fuel-fired power plants in

30. See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 423 (2011); Native Vill.
of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 856-57 (9th Cir. 2012).
31. See 549 U.S. 497, 518-21 (2007).
32. Id. at 518-21.
33. Id. at 518-20 (noting the "considerable relevance that the party seeking review here
is a sovereign State," emphasizing the "special position and interest of Massachusetts," and
noting that in light of "Massachusetts' stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests, the
Commonwealth is entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis").
34. Id. at 519 (noting Massachusetts' status as an owner of "a great deal of the 'territory
alleged to be affected' constitutes a particularized injury and "only reinforces the conclusion
that its stake in the outcome of this case is sufficiently concrete to warrant the exercise of federal
judicial power").
35. Id. at 516 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2012)); see also id. at 517-18 ("[A] litigant
to whom Congress has 'accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests,' here, the
right to challenge agency action unlawfully withheld 'can assert that right without meeting all
the normal standards for redressability and immediacy.' When a litigant is vested with a
procedural right, that litigant has standing if there is some possibility that the requested relief
will prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed the
litigant." (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992)) (internal citations
omitted)).
36. See Brescia, supra note 8, at 32.
37. Am. Elec. Power v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 418 (2011) ("In July 2004, two groups
of plaintiffs filed separate complaints in the Southern District of New York against the same five
major electric power companies. The first group of plaintiffs included eight States and New
York City, the second joined three nonprofit land trusts . . . ." (footnotes omitted)).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol70/iss3/3
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twenty states, and who collectively were alleged to be "the five largest
emitters of carbon dioxide in the United States." 38 Plaintiffs alleged these
activities constituted a public nuisance under federal common law, or
alternatively, state tort law.3 9 The district court dismissed both suits, ruling
they presented non-justiciable political questions, 40 but the Second Circuit
reversed, holding the suits were not barred by the political question doctrine
and the plaintiffs had adequately alleged Article III standing. 4' The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and reversed but declined to address the questions of
standing and whether the suits raised justiciable questions. Rather, the Court
grounded its holding on the conclusion that the Clean Air Act and the EPA
action the Act authorizes displace the federal common-law claims asserted by
the plaintiffs. 42

The Ninth Circuit, too, declined to address the question of standing and
justiciability in a public nuisance suit relating to climate change. 43 InKivalina,
the governing body of an Alaskan tribal village had filed suit against twentyfour oil, energy, and utility companies, alleging its village was threatened by
the reduction in protective sea ice and an increase in storms and flooding
allegedly caused by the climate change resulting from the defendants
greenhouse gas emissions. 44 The plaintiffs asserted a nuisance claim under
federal common law, and alternatively, under state tort law. 45 The defendants
moved to dismiss, arguing the tribes lacked standing, had asserted nonjusticiable political questions, and had asserted claims that were displaced by
the Clean Air Act. 46 The district court dismissed the nuisance claims for lack
of standing and for presenting non-justiciable questions. 47 The Ninth Circuit
48
affirmed but did not rely on the doctrines of standing or justiciability.
Rather, like the Supreme Court's opinion in American Electric Power, the

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005),
vacated and remanded, 582 F.3d 309 (2nd Cir. 2009), rev'd, 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
41. Am. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d at 392.
42. Am. Elec. Power, 564 U.S. at 415.
43. See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 856-57 (9th Cir.
2012).
44. Id. at 853-54.
45. See id.
46. Id. at 854.
47. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 879-80 (N.D.
Cal. 2009), aff'd, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).
48. Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 858.
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Ninth Circuit's panel ruling focused solely on the statutory displacement of
the federal common law of nuisance. 49
As noted above, the Second Circuit held in American Electric Power that
the plaintiffs, including New York City and several private land trusts, had
adequately alleged standing and had presented a justiciable question.5 0 The
continued viability of that ruling is debatable in light of the Supreme Court's
subsequent reversal, albeit on other bases. At least one other circuit has
declined to extend standing to private litigants.5 1
The Second and Ninth Circuits may soon have another chance to opine
on municipal standing and the justiciability of public nuisance claims as they
review appeals from recently dismissed climate change lawsuits.52 In City of
New York v. BP, the City filed suit against five multinational oil and gas
companies, asserting public nuisance claims and alleging the companies are
responsible for climate change and the resulting costs bome by the City. 53 The
District Court dismissed the suit, ruling both that federal common law
displaces the City's state and federal common law claims and that the claims
are barred by the doctrine of the separation of powers. 54 in a similar lawsuit,
the Northern District of California likewise recently dismissed a municipal
public nuisance suit involving climate change, ruling the City's claims
"require a balancing of policy concerns" and "undoubtedly implicate the
interests of countless governments, both foreign and domestic." 5 5
Accordingly, the district court held the claims regarding climate change and
implicating environmental policy were best left to the legislative and
executive branches. 56 Clearly, both judges issuing these recent rulings
understood "that empowering courts to determine national policy is dangerous
57
precedent and counterproductive."

49. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d 309, 349 (2nd Cir. 2009), rev'd, 564 U.S.
410 (2011).
50. Id.
51. Comer v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., 585 F.3d 855, 866-67 (5th Cir. 2009), vacated, 607
F.3d 1049, 1055 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (vacating original opinion extending Massachusetts
v. EPA to permit claims by private litigants based on court's lack of quorum).
52. See City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); City
of Oaklandv. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1028-29 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
53. 325 F. Supp. 3d at 468-70.
54. Id. at 474-75.
55. City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1025, 1026.
56. Id. at 1025-26, 1029.
57. Luther Strange, Why Judges Aren't Buying Cities' Climate Change Lawsuits, REAL
CLEAR MKTS. (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2018/08/02/
whyjudgesarent buyingcitiesclimatechangelawsuits_103372.html.
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Municipal Suits Against Banks and Lenders for Subprime
Lending Practices

As with gun-related violence and climate change, the financial crisis
brought its own set of challenges and costs for municipalities and local
governments, including reduced property values (and consequently lowered
tax bases) and increased criminal activity.58 In response to these losses, cities
began instigating lawsuits against banks and mortgage lenders, alleging that
subprime lending practices constituted a public nuisance.59 Some
commentators have argued, however, that this "'profusion' of litigation is not
necessarily to win in court," but rather is meant to muster sufficient pressure
to force a settlement. 60

The first two lawsuits of this kind were filed by the mayor and city council
of Baltimore against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. alleging that Wells Fargo's
lending practices violated the Fair Housing Act and constituted a public
nuisance, 61and by the City of Cleveland against numerous investment banks

58. See, e.g., DAN IMMERGLUCK & GEOFF SMITH, WOODSTOCK INST., THERE GOES
THE NEIGHBORHOOD: THE EFFECT OF SINGLE-FAMILY MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES ON
PROPERTY VALUES 9 (2005), https://woodstockinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/TGTN_
Report-i .pdf (study showing that, within the City of Chicago during the 1990s, each
foreclosure reduced property values of all homes within a one-eighth mile radius by
approximately one percent); WILLIAM C. APGAR ET AL., HOME OWNERSHIP PRESERVATION
FOUNDATION, THE MUNICIPAL COST OF FORECLOSURES: A CHICAGO CASE STUDY 10-11
17 7 2
(2005), https://www.issuelab.org/resources/1772/
.pdf.

59. See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., 621 F. Supp. 2d 513, 515-16
(N.D. Ohio 2009); Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 677 F. Supp.
2d 847, 848 (D. Md. 2010). See also Victor E. Schwartz, Phil Goldberg & Christopher E. Appel,
Deep Pocket Jurisprudence: Where Tort Law Should Draw the Line, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 359,
382-87 (2018) (noting the plaintiffs framed their suits "under government public nuisance
theory," and the "lawsuits often do not provide specific factual allegations of tortious conduct;
rather, they rely on general notions of wrongdoing to create industry culpability in the minds of
the public" and "rest entirely on generalized notions").
60. Schwartz, Goldberg & Appel, supra note 59, at 387 (citing Nate Hegyi, Cherokee

Nation Sues Wal-Mart, CVS, Walgreens Over Tribal Opioid Crisis, NPR (Apr. 25, 2017, 5:58
PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2017/04/25/485887058/cherokee-nation-sueswal-mart-cvs-walgreens-over-tribal-opioid-crisis). See also U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR
LEGAL REFORM, WAKING THE LITIGATION MONSTER: THE MISUSE OF PUBLIC NUISANCE

(Mar. 2019) (citing Richard F. Scruggs, Are Opioids the New Tobacco?, LAW360 (Sept. 15,
2017, 11:04 AM), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/962715 ("[T]he success of the opioid cases
will depend upon whether the plaintiffs can muster sufficient legal, political and public relations
pressure to force a settlement.").

61. See Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 848.
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alleging the defendants' promotion of the sale of subprime mortgage products
constituted a public nuisance. 62 Both cases were quickly dismissed.63
In Wells Fargo, the District Court for the District of Maryland held that
the city lacked standing to bring a public nuisance claim because there was no
"causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of." 64 The

court noted that, "using the City's own figures, Wells Fargo is responsible for
only a negligible portion of the City's [alleged damages]." 65 The court further
relied on the fact that the defendant lenders did not create the environment
giving rise to the foreclosures and injuries the City alleged:
It may be entirely reasonable to posit-as the City's allegations
amply support that unscrupulous lenders took advantage of inner
city residents living in a dysfunctional environment to induce them
to make loans they could not afford. It does not follow, however, that
it is reasonable to infer-as the City argues-that the unscrupulous
lenders themselves created the dysfunctional environment they
exploited.66
Accordingly, the court dismissed the City's public nuisance claim.67
In Ameriquest, the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio held
that the City's public nuisance claim failed as a matter of law for multiple
reasons. 68 In particular, the court held the defendants' conduct did not amount
to an unreasonable interference with a public right, and the City failed to
allege facts sufficient to demonstrate any causal connection between
defendants' conduct and the City's alleged injury. 69 With respect to
determining whether defendants' conduct rose to the level of public nuisance,
the court explained:
Ohio courts have long imposed the following concrete limitation on
public nuisance claims: "What the law sanctions cannot be held to be
a public nuisance." This is but another way of saying that although it

62. See Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., 621 F. Supp. 2d at 515-16.
63. See Wells FargoBank, N.A., 677 F. Supp. 2d at 851; Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., 621 F.
Supp. 2d at 536.
64. Wells FargoBank, N.A., 677 F. Supp. 2d at 849, 850.
65. Id. at 850.
66. Id. at 851.
67. Id.
68. See Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., 621 F. Supp. 2d at 536.
69. See id. at 528, 530, 533, 535-36. The court also went on to conclude that the City's
claims of public nuisance against investment banks were preempted by state law and barred by
the economic loss rule. See id. at 518-22.
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would be a nuisance at common law, conduct which is fully
authorized by statute or administrative regulation is not an actionable
tort. This is especially true where a comprehensive set of legislative
acts or administrative regulations governing the details of a particular
kind of conduct exist....

Under a long line of decisions, a showing that the challenged conduct
is subject to regulation and was performed in conformance therewith
insulates such conduct from suit as a public nuisance. This is so
regardless of whether, despite compliance with the regulations, such
conduct could otherwise be described as negligent.70

'

In this case, the court found that "[m]ortgage lending in general is subject
to a vast regulatory regime," and, because the City did not challenge
defendants' compliance with the regulations, held that defendants could not
be liable for public nuisance. 7
Additionally, the court held that the City failed to plead facts to prove
proximate causation, noting "[i]t would be tremendously difficult, if not
completely impossible, to determine which of the City's damages are
attributable to Defendants' alleged misconduct and not to some absent
party." 72 The court recognized that, in fact, none of the City's alleged damages
were directly linked to the defendants but rather were "purely contingent on
harm first visited upon absent third-parties." 73 Accordingly, the court held the
City's public nuisance claim also failed as a matter of law for lack of
4
proximate causation. 7

In its analysis, the court distinguished this case from City of Cincinnati,
in which the Ohio Supreme Court permitted Cincinnati to bring public
nuisance claims against gun manufacturers and retailers.7 5 Specifically, the
district court focused on the "distinction between conduct that is subject to
regulation,"-such as mortgage lending "and conduct that is merely

70. Id. at 526, 528 (first quoting Allen Freight Lines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 595
N.E.2d 855, 857 (Ohio 1992); then quoting Brown v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 622 N.E.2d
1153, 1159 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993)) (internal citations omitted).
71. Id. at 528.
72. Id. at 533.
73. Id. at 535 (citing Holmes v. Secs. Inv'r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 271 (1992)).
74. Id. at 536.
75. Id.
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lawful,"-like the distribution and sale of firearms. 76 Also, as did the
Maryland District Court in Wells Fargo,the court emphasized the fact that the
defendants did not create the underlying issue or environment: "the guns that
comprised the illegal firearms market in City of Cincinnatioriginated with the
defendant gun manufacturers, while in this case, Defendants did not originate
the underlying subprime loans or initiate foreclosures in Cleveland, but
merely provided funding for subprime lending." 77 Furthermore, the court
noted that the harm alleged by Cincinnati could have occurred independent of
any injury to third parties, as opposed to the damages sought by Cleveland
that could not arise absent any foreclosure.7 1
B.

Opioid Litigation and the Uncertain Future Expansion of Public
Nuisance Claims

The latest potential evolution in public nuisance claims brought by local
governments involve lawsuits against makers and distributors of opioid
pharmaceutical drugs. The first lawsuits filed against opioid manufacturers in
response to the growing opioid epidemic were filed by state Attorneys
General-specifically, the Attorneys General for Mississippi, Ohio, Missouri,
and Oklahoma. 79 Although the Mississippi Attorney General filed suit
approximately one-and-a-half years before the Attorneys General for Ohio,
Missouri, and Oklahoma, the claims and allegations asserted and the
defendants named-are all quite similar.s0 Opioid manufacturers Purdue,
Teva/Cephalon," Johnson & Johnson, Janssen, Endo, Allergan, and Actavis

76. Id. at 528 (citing City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1140,
1143 (Ohio 2002)).
77. Id. at 536; see also Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
677 F. Supp. 2d 847, 851 (D. Md. 2010) (noting that defendants didnot create "the dysfunctional
environment," but merely exploited it).
78. Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., 621 F. Supp. 2d at 536 (citing City of Cincinnati,768 N.E.2d
at 1148-49).
79. Complaint, Mississippi v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 25CHI:15-CV-001814 (Miss.
Chan. Ct. December 15, 2015); Complaint, Ohio v. Purdue Pharma L.P., CV-17 CI 00261 (Ohio
Ct. Com. Pl. May 31, 2017); Complaint, Missouri v. Purdue Pharma, L.P. (Mo. Cir. Ct.);
Complaint, Oklahoma v. Purdue Pharma L.P., CJ-2017-816 (Okla. Dist. Ct. June 30, 2017).
80. See generally Complaint, Mississippi, supra note 79 (25CHI:15-CV-001814);
Complaint, Ohio, supra note 79 (CV-17 CI 00261); Complaint, Missouri, supra note 79;
Complaint, Oklahoma, supra note 79 (No. CJ-2017-816).
81. Teva completed its acquisition of Cephalon in 2011. See Teva Completes Acquisition
of Cephalon, TEVA (last visited Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.tevapharm.com/news/teva
completes acquisition of cephalon 10_11.aspx.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol70/iss3/3

14

Strange: A Prescription for Disaster: How Local Governments' Abuse of Publ
2019]

PRESCRIPTION FOR DISASTER: ABUSE OF PUBLIC NUISANCE

531

were named as defendants in at least three of the four actions.82 Each Attorney
General brought similar claims: Medicaid fraud, violation of consumer
protection statutes, fraud/deceit, fraudulent/negligent misrepresentation,
public nuisance, and other violations of state laws. In each case, the
allegations supporting these claims were essentially the same: that the
defendants were aware of the substantial risks associated with use of opioid
medications as compared with the unproven and disputed benefits; that
defendants willfully and knowingly disregarded and concealed the risks from
doctors and consumers; that defendants used unbranded marketing (i.e.,
doctors, opinion leaders, and "front groups") in order to disseminate false or
misleading information regarding opioid usage; that defendants used unfair
and deceptive marketing techniques to target vulnerable and lucrative
populations; that defendants' conduct gave rise to increased opioid usage,
both prescribed and through illegal black market dealings; and that the States
and their citizens suffered considerable harm from the increased opioid use,
including higher rates of addiction and death, Medicaid costs related to
increased prescriptions, and costs related to treatment of addiction. 83
In June 2017, around the same time that the Ohio, Missouri, and
Oklahoma Attorneys General were filing their lawsuits, another forty-one
states' Attorneys General joined together to create a coalition to conduct a
joint investigation into the opioid epidemic.8 4 To accomplish its goal, the
coalition served investigative subpoenas and information requests on eight
manufacturers and distributors of opioid medications. 5 Each of the
manufacturers served with subpoenas had already been named as defendants
in the four initial AG lawsuits discussed above: Endo, Janssen,
Teva/Cephalon, Allergan, and Purdue.86 The joint investigation also targeted

82. Complaint, Mississippi, supra note 79 (25CHI:15-CV-001814); Complaint, Ohio,
supra note 79 (CV-17 CI 00261); Complaint, Missouri, supra note 79; Complaint, Oklahoma,
supra note 79 (No. CJ-2017-816). Opioid manufacturers Purdue, Johnson & Johnson, and
Janssen were named as defendants in all of the lawsuits. Watson, on the other hand, was only
named in the Oklahoma case.
83. Complaint, Mississippi, supra note 79 (25CHI:15-CV-001814); Complaint, Ohio,
supra note 79, at 66-99; Complaint, Missouri, supra note 79, at 27-41; Complaint, Oklahoma,
supra note 79, at 20-31 (No. CJ-2017-816).
84. News Release, Office of Attorney General of Texas, AG Paxton: 41-State
Investigation Requests Documents from Companies that Manufacture and Distribute Highly
Addictive Opioid Drugs (Sept. 19, 2017) [hereinafter News Release, Paxton]; see also News
Release, New York State Office of the Attorney General, A.G. Schneiderman, Bipartisan
Coalition of AGs Expand Multistate Investigation Into Opioid Crisis (Sept. 19, 2017)
[hereinafter News Release, Schneiderman].
85. See News Release, Paxton, supra note 84; News Release, Schneiderman, supra note
84.
86. News Release, Paxton, supra note 84; News Release, Schneiderman, supra note 84.
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three opioid distributors AmerisourceBergen, Cardinal Health, and
McKesson which at the time accounted for more than ninety percent of
opioid distribution in the United States. 7 According to Texas Attorney
General Ken Paxton, the goal of the investigation was "to collect enough
information so that the multi-state coalition can effectively evaluate whether
manufacturers and distributors engaged in unlawful practices in the
marketing, sale, and distribution of opioids."" Once it was determined what
role, if any, the manufacturers and distributors had in creating or prolonging
the opioid crisis, the coalition would determine an appropriate course of
action.89

Since the joint investigation, dozens of states' Attorneys General have
filed lawsuits against opioid manufacturers and distributors. 90 These lawsuits
were filed in state court, and although in some cases they named additional
manufacturers and distributors-either by name or as "Doe" corporationsevery case named Purdue Pharma as a defendant. 91 Additionally, each
Attorney General brought claims for violation of state consumer protection or

87.

News Release, Schneiderman, supra note 84; see News Release, Paxton, supra note

84.
88. News Release, Paxton, supra note 84.
89. Id.
90. See Jonathan Stempel, New York Sues OxyContin Maker Purdue Pharma Over
Opioids, REUTERS (Aug. 14, 2018, 12:13 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-opioidspurduepharma/new-york-sues-oxycontin-maker-purdue-pharma-over-opioids-idUSKBNIKZ
1WZ ("New York joined at least 26 other U.S. states and Puerto Rico to sue Purdue over
opioids."); see also Joanna Walters, Sackler Family Members Face Mass Litigation and
Criminal Investigations Over Opioids Crisis, GUARDIAN
(Nov.
19,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/nov/19/sackler-family-members-face-mass-litig
ation-criminal-investigations-over-opioids-crisis ("Purdue is also being sued by at least 30 states
in state court."). The states include Alaska, Arizona, Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Florida,
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and
West Virginia. See Marilyn Odendahl, Citing Opioids'Devastation,State Sues PurduePharma,
IND. LAW. (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/48769-citing-opioidsdevastation-state-sues-purdue-pharma.
91. See, e.g., Complaint, South Carolina v. Purdue Pharma L.P. (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. Aug.
15, 2017); Complaint, Massachusetts v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 1884CV0 1808 (Mass. Super.
Ct. Jun. 13, 2018); Amended Complaint, Florida v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 2018-CA-001438
(Fl. Cir. Ct. Nov. 16, 2018); Complaint, North Carolina v. Purdue Pharma L.P. (N.C. Super. Ct.
May 15, 2018); Complaint, North Dakota v. Purdue Pharma L.P. (N.D.S. Centr. Jud. Dist. May
15, 2018); Complaint, Tennessee v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 1-173-18 (6th Jud. Dist. Tenn.
May 15, 2018).
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unfair trade practices laws, 92 and frequently causes of action for negligence
and public nuisance were also included. 93
In addition to the actions brought by the Attorneys General, numerous
local governments have filed their own lawsuits against opioid manufacturers
and distributors. Notably, public nuisance suits brought by local government
differ from those brought by Attorneys General in at least one respectnamely the local government's inability to recover for injury to citizens. In
South Carolina, for example, the Attorney General possesses parens patriae
authority and may sue for harms suffered by the citizens of the State. 94 In
contrast, local governments lack parens patriae authority and thus, may sue
only based on injuries the city itself has suffered, 95 or potentially, when the
issue is one of "overriding public concern." 96 A similar dichotomy is present

92. See, e.g., Complaint, South Carolina, supra note 91, ¶¶ 164-209, at 57-66;
Complaint, Massachusetts, supra note 91, ¶¶ 246-61, at 68-71; Amended Complaint, Florida,
supra note 91, ¶¶ 430-43, at 95-97; Complaint, North Carolina,supra note 91, ¶ 127, at 44-45;
Complaint, North Dakota, supra note 91, ¶¶ 173-98, at 51-58; Complaint, Tennessee, supra
note 91, ¶¶ 924-51, at 261-67.
93. See, e.g., Complaint, Massachusetts, supra note 91, ¶¶ 263-89, at 71-76; Amended
Complaint, Florida, supra note 91, ¶¶ 464-505 at 103-10; Complaint, South Carolina, supra
note 91, ¶¶ 227-34, at 69-71.
94. See, e.g., Condon v. State, 354 S.C. 634, 641, 583 S.E.2d 430, 434 (2003) ("This
Court has recognized that the Attorney General has broad statutory and common law authority
in his capacity as the chief legal officer of the State to institute actions involving the welfare of
the State and its citizens, including vindication of wrongs committed collectively against the
citizens ofthe State.") (emphasis added); see also 23 W. THOMAS LAVENDER, JR., THOMAS G.
EPPINK, S.C. JUR. PUBLIC NUISANCE § 29 (2018) ("The Attorney General of South Carolina has
long had broad power to institute proceedings to abate public nuisances.") (citing State ex rel.

Lyon v. Columbia Water Power Co., 82 S.C. 181, 63 S.E. 884 (1909)); cf 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)
(2012) (granting exclusive authority to state Attorneys General to bringparenspatriae actions
on behalf of the state's citizens to recover for injuries sustained from violations of Title 15 of
the United States Code).

95.

See, e.g., County of Lexington v. City of Columbia, 303 S.C. 300, 301, 400 S.E.2d

146, 147 (1991) (holding a county lacked standing to maintain a suit unless it was based on an
infringement of the county's own proprietary interest or statutory right because "[a]s a political
subdivision of the State, . . . [the county] lacks the sovereignty to maintain such a suit under the
doctrine of parenspatriae")(citations omitted); Capital View Fire Dist. v. County of Richland,

297 S.C. 359, 362, 377 S.E.2d 122, 124 (Ct. App. 1989) ("The doctrine ofparenspatriaeapplies
only to sovereigns asserting at least quasi-sovereign interests apart from the interests of
particular private citizens. Political subdivisions, such as cities and counties, however, lack the
element of sovereignty that is a prerequisite to maintaining a suit under the doctrine of parens
patriae.")(citations omitted).

96.

County ofLexington, 303 S.C. at 301, 400 S.E.2d at 147. Other holdings have omitted

this seeming exception and have reiterated that a local government unit has standing only when
it can establish some infringement or injury to its own proprietary interests or statutory rights.

See, e.g., Town of Arcadia Lakes v. S.C. Dept. of Health & Envtl. Control, 404 S.C. 515, 529,
745 S.E.2d 385, 392 (Ct. App. 2013) (citing Sea Pines Ass'n for Prot. of Wildlife, Inc. v. S.C.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2019

17

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 3
534

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 70: 517

in other states.9 7 Accordingly, public nuisance suits brought by local
governments whether against firearm manufacturers, oil producers, or
opioid manufacturers and distributors-are founded not on the injuries
suffered directly by the individuals injured by the alleged wrongdoing but
rather on the alleged secondary injuries the city or county itself suffered in
responding to or dealing with the situation.
Nevertheless, as of December 12, 2017, at least forty-six lawsuits had
been filed by local governments and municipalities against opioid
manufacturers and retailers alleging "improper marketing of and
inappropriate distribution of various prescription opiate medications into
cities, states, and towns across the country."98 On motion of the plaintiffs in
these forty-six cases, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation centralized
and transferred those cases to the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio.99 Over the next several months, the MDL swelled to more
than four-hundred centralized lawsuits brought by cities and counties, Native

Dep't of Nat. Res., 345 S.C. 594, 601, 550 S.E.2d 287, 291 (2001); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)); City of Spartanburg v. County of Spartanburg, 303 S.C. 393, 395,
401 S.E.2d 158, 159 (1991) (citing Richland Cty. Recreation Dist. v. City of Columbia, 290 S.C.
93, 348 S.E.2d 363 (1986)); Glaze v. Grooms, 324 S.C. 249, 255, 478 S.E.2d 841, 845 (1996);
Beaufort County v. Trask, 349 S.C. 522, 528, 563 S.E.2d 660, 663 (Ct. App. 2002).
97. See, e.g., Arapahoe Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. Denver Bd. of Water Comm'rs, 718 P.2d
235, 241 (Colo. 1986) (en banc) (holding that counties cannot sue underparenspatriae because
they "are not independent governmental entities existing by reason of any inherent sovereign
authority of their residents" (citing Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. Love, 470 P.2d 861, 862 (Colo.
1970) (en banc))); Bd. of Comm'rs of Union Cty. v. McGuinness, 80 N.E.3d 164, 170 (Ind.
2017) (holding that "a county has no sovereign powers and cannot act as parens patriae,
asserting the claims of its residents" (quoting Bd. of Comm'rs of Howard Cty. v. Kokomo City
Plan Comm'n, 330 N.E.2d 92, 101 (Ind. 1975))); Coldsprings Twp. v. Kalkaska Cty. Zoning
Bd. of Appeals, 755 N.W.2d 553, 555 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that "political subdivisions
such as cities and counties, whose power is derivative and not sovereign, cannot sue as parens
patriae." (quoting In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 131
(9th Cir. 1973))); State v. Dover, 891 A.2d 524, 531-32 (N.H. 2006) (holding that, under the
parenspatriaedoctrine, the cities had no standing to sue and their claims "must yield to the
attorney general's suit"); Bergen County v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 160 A.2d 811, 815-16 (N.J.
1960) (holding that a county, as a "subdivision of the State," does not have parenspatriae
authority to represent its residents); Tuma v. Kerr County, 336 S.W.3d 277, 282 (Tex. App.
2010) (noting that the parens patriae doctrine "does not apply to counties, whose power is
derivative and not sovereign"). But see Town of Riverhead v. Long Island Lighting Co., 258
A.D.2d 643, 644 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (holding that a town could bring a cause of action under
parenspatriaeto recover damages for breach of the public trust "[c]ontrary to the defendant's
contention and the holding of the Supreme Court").
98. Transfer Order at 1, In re Nat'l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP
(J.P.M.L. Dec. 12, 2017). "[A]ll of the cases on the motion before us involve claims brought by
political subdivisions.". Id. at 3.
99. Id. at 1, 4.
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'

American tribes, hospitals, and third-party payors.'o All told, as of
publication, lawsuits against opioid manufacturers and distributors are
estimated to have topped 1,500, including those brought by Attorneys
General, the suits centralized in the MDL, and other suits brought by
individuals or other plaintiffs.' 0
At the outset, Judge Dan Aaron Polster the judge presiding over the
MDL adopted an unusual approach, dispensing with standard litigation
processes normally employed at the commencement of such a proceeding,
such as discovery, setting a schedule for dispositive motions, and the like, and
instead, essentially required the parties to enter meaningful settlement
negotiations.1 02 The parties subsequently persuaded Judge Polster that the
"settlement track" he had encouraged the parties to pursue would be aided if,
simultaneously, there was a "litigation track" that included selecting three test
cases-designated as "track one" cases-and setting a schedule for
dispositive motions, discovery, trial preparation, and trial in those cases.1 03
That scheduling order was subsequently amended, and trial in the "track one"
test cases is currently set for September 3, 2019.104

100. In particular, three Native American tribes from South Dakota and a Cherokee tribe
all filed suits against opioid drug manufacturers. Sari Horwitz, 3 S.D. Indian Tribes Sue
Drugmakers
Over
Opioid Addiction,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
9,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/3-sd-indian-tribes-sue-drugmakersover-opioid-addiction/2018/01/09/7bb50438-f568- 11 e7-a9e3-ab 18ce41436astory.html;
see
Jan Hoffman, Cherokee Can'tSue OpioidDistributorsin Tribal Court, Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/11/health/cherokee-opioids-lawsuit.html.
101. See Sara Randazzo, OpioidMakers Ask Counties for Proofof Harm, WALL STREET
J. (Oct. 18, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/opioid-makers-ask-counties-forproof-of-harm- 1 539867600?mod=e2tw.
102. See Jan Hoffman, Can This Judge Solve the Opioid Crisis?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/health/opioid-crisis-judge-lawsuits.html; see also
Minutes of Initial Pretrial Conference - 1/9/2018 at 1, In re Nat'l Prescription Opiate Litig., No.
1: 17-md-02804-DAP (N.D. Ohio Jan. 11, 2018) (noting that during the initial pretrial conference
"the Court solicited and obtained the consensus of Counsel to focus everyone's present efforts
on abatement and remediation of the opioid crisis rather than pointing fingers and litigating legal
issues" and scheduling a subsequent conference "devoted to preliminary settlement
discussions.").
103. See Case Management Order One at 1, 6, In re Nat'l Prescription Opiate Litig., No.
1: 17-md-2804-DAP (N.D. Ohio Apr. 11, 2018).
104. Case Management Order No. 7 Setting New Deadlines for Track One Cases at 2, In
re Nat'l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-2804-DAP (N.D. Ohio Aug. 13, 2018).
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III. LAWSUITS BROUGHT BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ASSERTING PUBLIC
NUISANCE CLAIMS ARE AN IMPROPER, OR AT BEST, ILL-SUITED FORUM
IN WHICH TO ADDRESS POLICY-TYPE QUESTIONS

Courts and commentators have noted the expansion of the theory of
public nuisance beyond its traditional bounds is fraught with problems. 0 5 A
discussion of the full extent of those problems-and the viable legal defenses
that may be raised against such claims-is beyond the scope of this Article.1 06

105. See generally Ausness, supra note 8, at 871-73 (describing the legal hurdles
confronting municipal plaintiffs who seek to expand the scope of public nuisance law to
encompass claims against product manufacturers). In the context of municipal public nuisance
claims against gun manufacturers, for example, some courts have entirely rejected such claims,
which would expand the scope of public nuisance law so far beyond its traditional bounds
(namely interference with the use and enjoyment of land or a statutory violation implicating
health and safety) as to threaten to supplant the whole of products liability law and even the
entirety tort law. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415, 421 (3d
Cir. 2002); Camden Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536, 539
(3d Cir. 2001); People v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 309 A.D. 2d 91, 93-94, (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
Other courts, however, have blessed a more expansive theory of public nuisance suits, relying
in a broad definition found in the Restatement, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C
(AM. LAW INST. 2017), and have recognized the viability of public nuisance claims against gun
manufacturers. See, e.g., White v. Smith & Wesson, 97 F. Supp. 2d 816, 829 (N.D. Ohio 2000)
(refusing to dismiss the city of Cleveland's negligence and public nuisance claim against gun
maker); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1143-44 (Ohio 2002);
James v. Arms Tech., Inc., 820 A.2d 27, 50-51 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (holding City
of Newark could proceed with its public nuisance claim even though defendant's alleged
wrongdoing did not harm any interest in property); City of Gary ex rel King v. Smith & Wesson
Corp., 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1230-31 (Ind. 2003) (adopting an expansive view of what could
constitute a public nuisance).
106. In the context of municipal public nuisance lawsuits against opioid manufacturers and
distributors, for example, the defendants may argue that learned intermediaries (namely,
prescribing physicians and the pharmacists who fill the prescriptions) stand between the drug
makers and the public and disrupt any causal chain between the drug makers' conduct and the
alleged harms to individuals who abuse the drugs. See Schwartz, Goldberg & Appel, supra note
59, at 384-86. Similarly, such defendants may argue the vast majority of people who abuse
opioid drugs do so as a result of intervening, intentional, and often criminal acts by the abuser
or third parties. See id. at 382. They may further dispute the local government's ability to
establish monetary damages uniquely caused by opioid abuse (as opposed to other drug abuse
or other confounding causes). See id. at 383. Furthermore, a number of the claims asserted in
the opioid suits rest on shaky legal grounds because the Controlled Substances Act "does not
have a private cause of action, and its standards are intentionally vague" and because "[t]here is
no common law duty under tort law to monitor a product, including a prescription drug, after it
is sold." Id. at 385, 386. Suits brought by individual litigants against opioid manufacturers have
also been largely stymied by standard litigation defenses. See Richard C. Ausness, The Role of
Litigation in the FightAgainst PrescriptionDrugAbuse, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 1117,1122 (2014)
("A number of individuals have brought suit against Purdue, contending that the company is
responsible for the consequences of their drug abuse and addiction. However, Purdue has won
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At a much more fundamental level, however, public nuisance claims brought
by local governments that exceed the claim's traditional scope suffer from a
more foundational flaw, namely that they inject courts and litigants into what
is, at bottom, a democratic policy-making decision that courts and litigants are
ill-suited to make. 0 7 In the context of public nuisance suits against gun
manufacturers, for example, a pervasive scheme of state and federal statutes
and regulations-enforced by multiple state and federal agencies-already
controls the manufacture, sale, purchase, transfer, possession, record-keeping,
destruction, theft, use, and misuse of firearms. 108 Similarly, in the case of
opioid drugs, Congress and the various state legislatures have already enacted
a comprehensive statutory scheme that is implemented by a complex and
pervasive regulatory framework overseen and enforced by multiple agencies
and boards controlling the development, testing, production, manufacturing,
distribution, labeling, advertising, prescribing, sale, possession, use, misuse,
abuse, theft, resale, and inter-state transportation of opioid drugs.1 09 The same
could be said for the extensive legislative and regulatory schemes controlling
the production and processing of fossil fuels (the focus of the public nuisance
suits pertaining to alleged climate change), offshore drilling (the focus of the
public nuisance claims arising from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill), or the
lending, bundling, and selling of residential loans in the form of mortgagebacked securities (the focus of the public nuisance suits relating to subprime
mortgage lending).

most of these cases on summary judgment by successfully raising issues such as lack of
causation, misuse, wrongful conduct, or running of the statute of limitations." (footnotes
omitted)).
107. The federal judge overseeing the hundreds of centralized suits in the multi-district
litigation against opioid manufacturers, distributors, and others has acknowledged the
awkwardness of using the judicial system to remedy what is, in fact, a societal problem best
suited for legislative policy-making and regulatory oversight and enforcement. See Hoffman,
supra note 102 ("'The judicial branch typically doesn't fix social problems, which is why I'm
somewhat uncomfortable doing this,' [Judge Dan Polster] said. 'But it seems the most human
thing to do."').
108. E.g., Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 922(a) (2012) (making it illegal for an
unlicensed person to make a firearm for sale or distribution); Nat'l Firearms Act of 1934, I.R.C.
§§ 5841-5859 (2012) (regulating manufacture and transfer of firearms); see also Does an
Individual Need a License to Make a Firearm for Personal Use?, ATF,
https://www.atf gov/firearms/qa/does-individual-need-license-make-firearm-personal-use (last
updated Nov. 6, 2018). See generally ATF, FEDERAL FIREARMS REGULATIONS REFERENCE

GUIDE (2014), https://www.atf gov/file/ 11241/download.
109. Including, but not limited to, the Federal Food and Drug Administration, the Drug
Enforcement Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, state law enforcement agencies, and
state boards that license and supervise physicians and pharmacists.
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These extensive statutory and regulatory schemes reflect extensive
legislative deliberation balancing the good, legitimate, and helpful uses of
various conduct or products against the dangers of their use and misuse. This
is, by definition, a policy-making calculus, and the imposition of civil liability
on a manufacturer whose conduct and product complied with these regulatory
requirements-and in many cases was expressly reviewed and authorized by
the supervising agency effectively replaces these policy decisions with more
onerous requirements or more restrictive controls. Accordingly, as explained
more fully below, such suits insert the courts into a policy-making role for
which they are, at best, ill-suited, and give litigants an outsized policy-shaping
role for which they have no constitutional or electoral claim.
A.

SeparationofPowers

The rise of local government public nuisance claims described in the
preceding section of this Article included several instances of suits brought
against industries or corporations relating to conduct or products that were
entirely compliant with federal, state, and local laws. In essence, such suits
amount to "regulation by litigation" by imposing what amounts to additional
and higher requirements than those established by the legislature or the
agencies vested with responsibility for regulating the conduct or product."1 0
By so doing, litigants and courts invade the province of the legislature and
violate the doctrine of the separation of powers."
Some courts in recent public nuisance suits have recognized this principle
and dismissed the lawsuits on this basis.11 2 For example, Judge Keenan of the
Southern District of New York dismissed the City's public nuisance claim
against oil producers for their alleged contributions to climate change because
such litigation impinged on the role of the political branches of government." 3
Judge Keenan explained:

110. See generally ANDREW P. MORRIss, BRUCE YANDLE, & ANDREW DORCHAK,
REGULATION BY LITIGATION (2008) (discussing the history and dangers of the growing practice
of regulating industries via lawsuits and settlement terms).
111. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has articulated a similar concept in a holding
affirming the dismissal of a municipal public nuisance suit against paint manufacturers. See In
re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 505 (N.J. 2007) (noting in part that the state legislature had
already enacted a "careful and comprehensive scheme" to address the danger of deteriorating
lead paint and that regime was not "meant to create an ill-defined claim that would essentially
take the place of its own enforcement, abatement, and public health fimding scheme").
112. See, e.g., City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 474-75 (S.D.N.Y.
2018); City of Oaklandv. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1028-29 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
113. See, e.g., City ofNew York, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 474-75 ("Climate change is a fact of
life, as is not contested by Defendants. But the serious problems caused thereby are not for the
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The Court recognizes that the City, and many other governmental
entities around the United States and in other nations, will be forced
to grapple with the harmful impacts of climate change in the coming
decades. However, the immense and complicated problem of global
warming requires a comprehensive solution that weighs the global
benefits of fossil fuel use with the gravity of the impending harms.
To litigate such an action for injuries from foreign greenhouse gas
emissions in federal court would severely infringe upon the foreignpolicy decisions that are squarely within the purview of the political
branches of the U.S. Government. Accordingly, the Court will
exercise appropriate caution and decline to recognize such a cause of
action. 114
Judge Alsup of the Northern District of California also reached the same
conclusion in City of Oakland:
[Q]uestions of how to appropriately balance these worldwide
negatives against the worldwide positives of the energy itself, and of
how to allocate the pluses and minuses among the nations of the
world, demand the expertise of our environmental agencies, our
diplomats, our Executive, and at least the Senate. Nuisance suits in
various United States judicial districts regarding conduct worldwide
are far less likely to solve the problem and, indeed, could interfere
with reaching a worldwide consensus. 115
Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court, "traditionally one of the most
influential and pro-plaintiff courts in the country on issues related to products
liability," as well as the Rhode Island Supreme Court, "recently [commented]
explicitly on the antidemocratic character of "courts seeking to use common
law claims to remedy a public health problem previously addressed in a far
different and inconsistent manner by the state legislature."1 6 Each court
emphasized that their state legislatures had enacted statutory and regulatory
schemes placing the burden and costs of abatement on property owners, rather

judiciary to ameliorate. Global warming and solutions thereto must be addressed by the two
other branches of government.").

114. Id. at 475-76.
115. City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1026.
116. Donald G. Gifford, Impersonating the Legislature: State Attorneys General and

ParensPatriaeProductLitigation, 49 B.C. L. REv. 913, 918 (2008) (citing State v. Lead Indus.
Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 457-58 (R.I. 2008); In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d at 505).
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than lead-paint manufacturers.1 7 Accordingly, the New Jersey and Rhode
Island Supreme Courts held it was improper for the Attorneys General to
attempt to use the judicial system to modify those schemes and shift the
burden onto the product manufacturers." 8 In other words, they acknowledged
the impropriety of permitting a court to impose a regulatory scheme contrary
to or inconsistent with the statutes and regulations enacted by the state
legislature. 119

'

Indeed, even Judge Silverstein the Rhode Island Superior Court judge
whose refusal to dismiss the state Attorney General's public nuisance action
against lead-paint manufacturers was subsequently reversed by the Rhode
Island Supreme Court' 20-acknowledged that the issues presented by such
claims were "a polycentric problem that cannot easily be resolved through a
traditional courtroom-bound adjudicative process," essentially admitting the
judiciary's inability to resolve complex questions of health and policy.' 2
From a practical standpoint, what each of these courts has recognized is
that the use of parens patriaeactions and public nuisance claims as a means
to address these types of pervasive policy concerns flies in the face of the
established allocation of powers between the legislature, the judiciary, and the
executive branches of government.1 22 In bringing these kinds of actions, states
and their political subdivisions have usurped the regulatory authority vested
in the legislature and the administrative agencies it appoints.1 23 Thus, the real
conflict is not so much between the judiciary and the legislature, but between
the legislature and the executive-namely the states and their political
subdivisions.1 24 Moreover, due to "both the disproportionate power of state
Attorneys General, particularly when acting collectively, to force a regulatory
settlement and the pragmatic political pressures facing state court judges that
might otherwise check the attorney general," these kinds of cases become a

117. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d at 457-58; In re Lead PaintLitig., 924 A.2d at 494.
118. See Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d at 457-58; In re Lead PaintLitig., 924 A.2d at 50005.
119. See Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d at 457-58; In re Lead PaintLitig., 924 A.2d at 50005; see also Gifford, supra note 116, at 919.
120. See Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d at 455-56.
121. State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, No. PC 99-5226, 2007 WL 711824, at *87 (R.I. Super.
Ct. Feb. 26, 2007) (quoting Hart v. Cmty. School Bd. of Brooklyn, 383 F. Supp. 699, 766-67
(E.D.N.Y. 1974)).
122. Gifford, supra note 116, at 946-47.
123. See id. at 950-51.
124. Id. at 951.
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breeding ground for "the greatest tyranny, namely, the accumulation of
excessive authority in a single branch of government."1 25
States and their agencies and subdivisions enjoy significantly greater
bargaining power in these types of lawsuits because few corporations have the
ability, let alone the willingness, to risk trial when the plaintiff is an entire
state asserting billions of dollars in damages from injuries to millions of
citizens.126 In this way, states are able to use litigation as a means of regulation
"[b]y threatening catastrophic consequences" in order to "persuade[] (or
coerce[]) the regulated entities to agree to a final outcome that looks like the
[traditional methods] of regulation-by-negotiation or regulation-byrulemaking: a set of detailed rules that constrain future behavior."1 27
However, there are no benefits to having states seek to regulate through
litigation as opposed to conventional rulemaking and legislative procedures.
Rather, "[t]he key to the attractiveness of regulation by litigation is exactly
this-that it enables regulators to assume powers that they otherwise lack."1 28
"It should be seen as a negative, not a positive, attribute of regulation by
litigation that it enables government and private actors to evade constitutional
restraints on their powers."1 29 As former Secretary of Labor Robert B. Reich
explained:
[T]he biggest problem is that these lawsuits are end runs around the
democratic process. We used to be a nation of laws, but this new
strategy presents novel means of legislating within settlement
negotiations of large civil lawsuits initiated by the executive branch.

125. Id at 952 (quoting M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in SeparationofPowers
Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1149 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298, 1299, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995)
(noting the "intense pressure to settle" facing corporate defendants in aggregate litigation in
which a single jury "will hold the fate of an industry in the palm of its hand" as compared with
the "decentralized process of multiple trials, involving different juries, and different standards
of liability, in different jurisdictions . . . "); Gifford, supra note 116, at 915-16.
127. Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle & Andrew Dorchak, Litigation: Regulation by
Litigation,

ENGAGE,

Feb.

2008,

at

109,

110,

https://fedsoc-cms-

public.s3.amazonaws.com/update/pdf/50GoDOY8E60TrrSFOTxtkQZqaGScJUXTaktmt5LO.
pdf. Of course, one of the downfalls of this kind of regulation is that it can only be effective if
all-or at least most-of the market participants are parties to the underlying lawsuit. See id
Naturally, if the parties were to settle, the agreement would bind only those entities named in
the lawsuit, placing them at a disadvantage with respect to the rest of the market while failing to
curb behavior of the remaining market entities. See id.
128. Id.
129. Id
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This is faux legislation, which sacrifices democracy to the discretion
of ... officials operating in secrecy.13 0
Additionally, the reality often is not that the legislature has failed to
regulate a particular industry, "but rather that the extent or type of legislative
or administrative regulation is not deemed optimal by the state attorney
general."' 3 ' Nevertheless, "the deliberative legislative process, with its
assortment of checks and balances, either constitutionally mandated or arising
from legislative tradition, offers comparative institutional advantages over the
attorney general's process of deciding whether to regulate a given industry or
a specific manufacturer through state-sponsored litigation." 13 2
"[I]t is commonly understood that, in a representative democracy,
macro-economic regulation is accomplished most appropriately by
elected officials and their lawful delegates." The legislative process
provides, theoretically and to a greater or lesser extent
realistically, an opportunity for all parties to be heard and for their
experts to testify.

As imperfect as the functioning of state legislatures in reality
may be, the attorney general's appropriate role within the
constitutional framework is not to replace the legislatively enacted
provisions regulating products with a regulatory scheme, whether
resulting from settlement or judicial decree, which implements his or
her own vision of social engineering. Nor will public policymaking
be improved by a process that prioritizes regulatory goals depending
on whether corporations with perceived deep pockets can be blamed
for causing a particular public health problem.' 33
Where the state legislature has, either expressly or impliedly, approved of
a state bringing such claims there can be little doubt that the state acts within
its constitutional authority, regardless of its intent to supplant the legislature's

130. Gifford, supra note 116, at 915 (quoting Robert B. Reich, Don't Democrats Believe
in Democracy?, WALL STREET J., Jan. 12, 2000, at A22).
131. Id. at 961.
132. Id. at 961-62 (citing James A. Henderson, Jr., The Lawlessness ofAggregative Torts,
34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 329, 338 (2005)).
133. Id. at 962, 969 (quoting Henderson, supra note 132, at 338).
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existing regulatory scheme.1 34 On the other hand, however, even without
explicitly prohibiting such claims, a state legislature can indicate its
disapproval of such lawsuits through the enactment of a thorough and holistic
statutory or regulatory scheme addressing the public concerns these lawsuits
seek to remedy.1 35 Specifically, the manufacturing and distribution of
prescription medications, including opioid painkillers, is highly regulated by
both federal and state legislatures. Thus, this same reasoning for prohibiting
regulatory lawsuits by states under the guise of public nuisance claims applies
equally to the opioid crisis. Finally, even if the legislature is entirely silent on
an issue, its failure to act should not, and in fact, cannot be interpreted as tacit
compliance to such litigation, especially in light of the significant hurdles to
the enactment of new legislation as compared with the ease of merely filing a
lawsuit. 136
Moreover, it is clear that a state's use of such regulatory lawsuits is not
only an invasion of the legislature's regulatory powers, but also its taxing and
spending powers when one considers the desired results of these parens
patriae actions. For example, as a result of the tobacco litigation, cigarette
prices rose to fund tobacco companies' settlement payments to the states,
creating the equivalent of a new, additional tax on cigarettes.1 37
In sum, parens patriaelawsuits instigated by states or their subdivisions
asserting public nuisance claims without the express or implicit approval of
the state legislature overstep the bounds of the powers constitutionally
allocated to the executive branch. 138 The decision such suits seek is not within
"the proper-and properly limited role of the courts in a democratic

134. Cf Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1952); see also
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.910 (West 2017) (statute enacted during height of tobacco litigation
implying authority for state Attorney General to utilize parens patriae actions); MD. CODE

ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-120(a) (West 2018) (same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 1901(h) (West
2018) (same). For additional information on the enactment of the Florida statute, see RichardN.

Pearson, The Florida Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act, 46 FLA. L. REv. 609, 611 (1994)
("Based on the discussion surrounding the adoption of the Act, the Legislature's clear purpose
in enacting it was to seek reimbursement of medical expenditures made on behalf of recipients
that are attributable to cigarette smoking." (citations omitted)).

135. See, e.g., State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 951 A.2d 428, 457-58 (R.I. 2008) (dismissing
Attorney General's public nuisance lawsuit against lead-paint manufacturers because the
legislature had clearly placed the burden of remedying the issue of childhood lead poisoning on
property owners, not manufacturers); In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 493-94, 501-02

(N.J. 2007) (same).
136. See, e.g., Gifford, supra note 116, at 960.
137. Id. at 962.
138. Id. at 964.
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society."' 39 In the absence of legislative authorization and guidance, courts
are "without competence" to address matters of policy,1 40 and they lack
authority to "formulate national policies or develop standards for matters not
legal in nature."141
B.

NonjusticiablePoliticalQuestion

Public nuisance suits brought by local governments present courts with
nonjusticiable political questions disguised as litigants' claims and prayers for
relief. An issue is cognizable by the courts-e.g., is justiciable-only when
the suit presents a case or controversy requesting a judgment or other remedy
that the court actually has the power to grant under the applicable state or
federal Constitution and statutes. "The political question doctrine is a species
of the separation of powers doctrine and provides that certain questions are
political as opposed to legal, and thus, must be resolved by the political
branches rather than by the judiciary."1 42 The doctrine limits the judiciary's
authority to "formulate national policies or develop standards for matters not
legal in nature."1 43 A lawsuit presents a nonjusticiable political question when
it requires the court to "'make a policy judgment of a legislative nature, rather
than resolving the dispute through legal and factual analysis."1 44 "This issue
surfaces because a court's power to grant relief is necessarily limited when a
party seeks the court's intervention in a matter that falls within the purview of
the legislative or executive branches of government."1 45
The Supreme Court has articulated six factors, any one of which
dispositively indicates the presence of a non-justiciable political question:

139. Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)).
140. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980).
141. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (citing United
States ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373, 1379 (1981) (footnote omitted)).
142. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 871 (N.D. Cal.
2009) (citing Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 980 (9th Cir. 2007)); see also Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) ("The nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a
fimction of the separation of powers.").
143. Japan Whaling Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 230 (citing Cannon, 642 F.2d at 1379).
144. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2dat 871 (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Peabody W. Coal Co., 400 F.3d
774, 784 (9th Cir. 2005)).
145. Warren Allen, The Unexpected Regulator: Regulation Through Settlement After
Vioxx & Bextra, 6 BROOKLYN J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 565, 572 (2012) (citing KATHLEEN M.
SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 49 (16th ed. 2007)); see also Gifford,
supra note 116, at 950 (noting that justiciability refers to "whether the matter is suitable for
judicial resolution or should be left to the legislative branch").
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Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2]
a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or
[4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.1 46
When analyzing and applying these six factors, lower courts have
rearticulated them in the form of three specific questions: "(i) Does the issue
involve resolution of questions committed by the text of the Constitution to a
coordinate branch of Government? (ii) Would resolution of the question
demand that a court move beyond areas of judicial expertise? (iii) Do
prudential considerations counsel against judicial intervention?"1 47
The presence of any one of the foregoing six factors is enough to
withdraw a matter from the realm of justiciability. Public nuisance suits
brought by local governments against gun makers, oil producers, drug
manufacturers, and the like present multiple indicia of nonjusticiability. For
example, the District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed
as non-justiciable the municipal public nuisance claims asserted against
twenty-four oil and power utility companies for their alleged contribution to
greenhouse gas emissions causing global warming.1 48 The district court's
ruling focused particularly on "whether 'resolution of the question demand[s]
that a court move beyond areas of judicial expertise."1 49 The court first
considered whether it had "the legal tools to reach a ruling that is 'principled,
rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions."'"5 o In other words, "whether
the judiciary is granting relief in a reasonedfashion versus allowing the
claims to proceed such that they 'merely provide "hope" without a substantive

146. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; see also Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 872 (citing Alperin v.
Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 547 (9th Cir. 2005)) (noting that "[a]ny one of the Baker factors
may be dispositive").

147. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 872 (quoting Wang v. Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 995 (9th
Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks removed).

148. Id. at 883.
149. Id. at 873 (quoting Wang, 416 F.3d at 995).
150. Id. at 874 (quotingAlperin, 410 F.3d at 552).
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legal basis for a ruling."" 5 ' The district court noted that, to apply the elements
of a public nuisance claim, "the factfinder [would] have to weigh, inter alia,
the energy-producing alternatives that were available in the past and consider
their respective impact on far ranging issues such as their reliability as an
energy source, safety considerations and the impact of the different
alternatives on consumers and business at every level."1 52 The judge or the
jury "would then have to weigh the benefits derived from those choices
against the risk that increasing greenhouse gases would in turn increase the
risk of causing flooding along the coast of a remote Alaskan locale."1 53 Thus,
the court held the analysis weighed in favor of dismissal because the plaintiffs
had "fail[ed] to articulate any particular judicially discoverable and
manageable standards that would guide a factfinder in rendering a decision
that is principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions."1 54
In addition, the district court in Kivalina considered whether it would be
possible to decide the case "without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion." 1 The court noted this factor applies if the
court's resolution of the matter would "remov[e] an important policy
determination from the Legislature."1 56 Applying this test to the plaintiffs'
public nuisance claims, the court recognized that, regardless of whether the
claim was for injunctive relief or damages, resolution of the case would
"require[] balancing the social utility of Defendants' conduct with the harm it
inflicts[,]" which "by definition, entails a determination of what would have
been an acceptable limit on the level of greenhouse gases emitted by
Defendants."' 5 7 The court noted determination of liability would also require
a decision as to who best to bear the costs of climate change. 158 "[T]he
allocation of fault-and cost-of global warming is a matter appropriately left
for determination by the executive or legislative branch in the first
instance."1 59 Thus, the court dismissed the action on the grounds of political
question. 160

151. Id. (quotingAlperin, 410 F.3d at 553).
152. Id. at 874.
153. Id. at 874-75.
154. Id. at 875.
155. Id. at 876 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)) (internal quotation marks
removed).
156. Id. (quoting In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 438 F.
Supp. 2d 291, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)) (internal quotation marks removed).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 876-77.
159. Id. at 877.
160. Id.
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The issues raised by the opioid litigation are comparable to those at issue
in Kivalina requiring expertise beyond the purview of the judiciary and
necessitating important policy determinations before a resolution can be
reached.16' For example, the second Baker factor indicates that "judicial
action must be governed by standard, by rule.... [L]aw pronounced by the
courts must be principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions."1 62
But societal epidemics such as drug abuse are ill-suited for judicial resolution
because the factfinder must balance the benefits and utility of the legitimate
and helpful uses of such prescription drugs against the risks posed by their
misuse and abuse, and there are not consistent, reliable, objective judicial
standards by which to make such an assessment. 163
Similarly, the courts lack any legal method for calculating damages,
crafting remedies, and allocating fault when the plaintiffs-cities, counties,
and other local governmental entities-allege injuries that cannot be traced
with any degree of precision to any specific drug manufacturer's conduct
(much less any illegal conduct) or even to any injury caused particularly by
opioid drugs (as opposed to other confounding causes). Accordingly, "the
allocation of fault-and cost-of [the conduct at issue] is a matter
appropriately left for determination by the executive or legislative branch."1 64
The third Baker factor also supports dismissal because addressing the socalled opioid crisis involves complex policy judgments.1 65 Adjudicating local
governments' public nuisance claims "would require the Court to balance the
competing interests of reducing [the alleged harm] and the interests of
advancing and preserving economic and industrial development," which is
"the type of initial policy determination to be made by the political
branches."1 66 Baker's fourth, fifth, and sixth factors-namely the need to
respect decisions of coordinate branches of government, adherence to policy
decisions already made, and the potential embarrassment from different
decisions from coordinate branches of government 67-likewise
counsel
against the justiciability of the opioid suits. The need for deference to
legislative and agency decision-making is explained in section II.A, supra,
and section II.D, infra, and the risk of conflicting outcomes is heightened

161. Id.
162. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (plurality).
163. See Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 874-75; State v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755
MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
164. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 877; see also Gen. Motors, 2007 WL 2726871, at *15.
165. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 427 (2011).
166. Gen. Motors, 2007 WL 2726871, at *8 (citing Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co.,

406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)); see also Comer v. Murphy Oil USA Inc., 839 F.
Supp. 2d 849, 864-65 (S.D. Miss. 2012).
167. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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where, as here, not only might the courts penalize conduct and products that
complied with legislative and agency dictates, but which other courts have or
will find to be permissible.
In sum, governmental litigation asserting public nuisance claims raises
considerable concerns regarding the justiciability of the political question
raised therein. Any judicial decree resulting from litigation that seeks to
penalize or impose heightened requirements on conduct or products that were
already regulated and were in compliance with existing law and regulations
intrudes on the legislature's province and addresses a political question. 168
Moreover, "[t]he type of decision-making process required to solve, or at least
ameliorate, complex social problems does not easily fit within either the
liability phase or the remedial phase of the judicial process," especially in light
of the "extremely vague and ill-defined boundaries of public nuisance and
other torts typically employed in parens patriae actions against product
manufacturers."1 69 For these reasons, the use of public nuisance claims in such
cases is inappropriate for judicial review on political question grounds.
C. Preemption
Claims brought under state law, including state common law claims of
public nuisance, may be expressly or impliedly preempted by federal law. The
principle of federal preemption is grounded in the Supremacy Clause, which
establishes that federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land . .. [the]
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."17 0 Stated simply, where
state and federal law conflict, state law must yield. Such conflict may arise
either expressly or impliedly, such as where Congress has occupied the field
through legislation; 171 where the claims interfere with, hinder, or stand as an
obstacle to federal purposes and objectives1 72 or, where the claims implicate
"uniquely federal interests" that are "committed by the Constitution and laws
of the United States to federal control."1 73
The preemption doctrine presents a substantial hurdle to public nuisance
suits arising from conduct or products already regulated by and in compliance

168. Gifford, supra note 116, at 920.
169. Id. at 962-63.
170. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
171. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348 (2001); N.Y. SMSA
Ltd. P'ship v. Town of Clarkstown, 612 F.3d 97, 104 (2d Cir. 2010) ("[C]onflict preemption
[exists] where . . the local law is an obstacle to the achievement of federal objectives.");
Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 313 (2d Cir. 2005).
172. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 881 (2000).
173. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks removed).
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with federal law and which, in some instances, were affirmatively authorized
and approved by federal regulators. For example, in the context of public
nuisance suits against manufacturers and distributors of opioid medications, a
host of federal laws, including the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act
("FDCA"),17 4 control every aspect of the development, testing, production,
manufacturing, distribution, labeling, advertising, prescribing, sale,
possession, use, misuse, abuse, theft, resale, and inter-state transportation of
pharmaceutical drugs. The FDCA expressly prohibits enforcement by states
or private actors.' 7 5 A state or local government ought not be able to avoid
this preclusive bar by simply imbedding its action in the vehicle of a public
nuisance claim. Likewise, the myriad federal statutes governing the sale,
possession, use, abuse, and transportation of such substances occupy the field
and displace any state common law claims that would impose different or
higher requirements. Accordingly, "[s]ome courts have properly recognized
that the FDA's regulation of prescription drug marketing precludes [state
consumer protection law] claims based on federal preemption."1 76 In addition,
at least one commentator has opined that "a settlement that attempted to
regulate the marketing of certain medical devices governed by the explicit
preemption statute would be unenforceable."1 77
Indeed, the FDCA and its implementing regulations (as well as other
relevant regulations promulgated by the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA")) serve an important federal objective-namely to ensure the safety
and efficacy of medical drugs and devices-and comprise a complex and
lengthy process for doing so. If states and local governments are permitted to
intrude into the sphere of regulating the safety and efficacy of medical drugs,

174. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399i (2012 & Supp. I 2017).
175. See id. § 337(a) (stating that "all such proceedings for the enforcement, or to restrain
violations, of [the FDCA] shall be by and in the name of the United States"); see also Buckman,
531 U.S. at 349 n.4 ("The FDCA leaves no doubt that it is the Federal Government rather than
private litigants who are authorized to file suit for noncompliance with the [FDCA].").
176. Victor E. Schwartz, Cary Silverman & Christopher E. Appel, "That's Unfair!" Says
Who-the Government or the Litigant?: Consumer Protection Claims Involving Regulated

Conduct, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 93, 119-20 (2007) (citing Pa. Emp. Benefit Tr. Fund v. Zeneca,
Inc., No. Civ. 05-075-SLR, 2005 WL 2993937, at *2-4 (D. Del. Nov. 8, 2005) (unpublished
opinion) (holding the Delaware Consumer Fraud Act does not apply to actions involving the
safety and efficacy of an FDA-approved prescription drug); Williams v. Purdue Pharma Co.,

297 F. Supp. 2d 171, 177-78 (D.D.C. 2003) (dismissing class action on behalf of patients
prescribed OxyContin for failure to state an actionable injury under consumer protection law)).

177. Allen, supra note 145, at 581 (citing Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 323
(2008)).
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the hindrances and obstacles to the federal objectives would be many.' 7 ' For
example, rather than complying solely with the FDA's complex but uniform
regime, drug and device manufacturers would suddenly be subject to a
patchwork scheme of fifty states' tort laws and consumer protection
statutes.1 79 Manufacturers may be reticent to introduce new drugs and devices
due to uncertain liability under such multiple overlapping enforcement
systems.

180

States, of course, possess authority to regulate issues of health and safety,
including practices governing the prescribing and distribution of prescription
medications. 18 Accordingly, a state may, if it wishes, place certain
restrictions and conditions on the use and prescription of certain medications,
even if the drug has received approval from the federal government through
the FDA without running afoul of the preemption doctrine. 82 A state may not,
however, ban or prohibit outright the use of a product that has undergone a
thorough assessment and approval by the FDA' 83 because doing so would
"obstruct the FDA's Congressionally-given charge" by "interpos[ing] its own
conclusion about [the drug's] safety and effectiveness" contrary to the FDA's
approval and endorsement.1 8 4

Nor does the United States Supreme Court's decision in Wyeth v.
Levine1 5 permit actions by states and governmental subdivisions that seek to
penalize or impose higher standards on products or conduct already
controlled, reviewed, and approved by federal law, regulations, and agencies.
In Levine, the plaintiff received a direct injection of an anti-nausea medication

178. See Buckman, 531 U.S. at 350 (noting that state law claims "inevitably conflict with
the FDA's responsibility to police fraud consistently with the Administration's judgment and
objectives").
179. Id. ("As a practical matter, complying with the FDA's detailed regulatory regime in
the shadow of 50 States' tort regimes will dramatically increase the burdens facing potential
applicants-burdens not contemplated by Congress in enacting the FDCA .... ).
180. See, e.g., Riegel, 552 U.S. at 326 (noting that Congress's "solicitude for those injured
by FDA-approved devices . . was overcome in Congress's estimation by solicitude for those
who would suffer without new medical devices ifjuries were allowed to apply the tort law of 50
States to all innovations").
181. See Zogenix, Inc. v. Patrick, No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 4273251, at *3 (D. Mass.
Aug. 28, 2014).
182. See id.; see also Catherine M. Sharkey, States vs. FDA, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1609,
1618-20 (2015).
183. See Zogenix, 2014 WL 1454696, at *2-3; see also Sharkey, supra note 182, at 1617
(citing Verified Amended Complaint at 14-15, Zogenix, Inc. v. Patrick, No. 1:14-cv-11689RWZ, 2014 WL 1454696 (D. Mass. Apr. 15, 2014)).
184. Zogenix, 2014 WL 1454696, at *2.
185. 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
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that resulted in gangrene and the eventual amputation of part of her arm.' 86
Levine brought a state tort suit against Wyeth, the manufacturer of the drug,
claiming that Wyeth knew but failed to warn that the direct intravenous
injection was more dangerous than other methods of administering the
medicine.'8 7 Wyeth argued that, because all label changes required FDA
approval, it could not have unilaterally amended the label as plaintiff alleged
it should have done.' The Court rejected Wyeth's defense, holding in part
that personal injury suits did not obstruct the purposes and objectives of
federal drug labeling regulations. 8 9 Both Levine's holding and its reasoning,
however, limit its applicability to a very particular set of facts and
circumstances, namely state common law tort suits for personal injury brought
by individuals. Indeed, the Supreme Court subsequently limited the scope of
Levine's holding' 90 and has reaffirmed the viability of implied obstacle
preemption.19'
For the same reasons, states and municipalities are preempted from using
public nuisance litigation to regulate opioid manufacturers and distributors
who are already subject to comprehensive federal rules and regulations. The
legislative and executive branches, and their duly-appointed agencies, are
constitutionally charged with the promulgation and enforcement of statutes
and regulations governing the manufacture and distribution of opioid
medications. Allowing local governments to challenge actions taken in full
compliance with those statutory and regulatory schemes would be to allow the
states to "stand[] in the way of 'the accomplishment and execution of an
92
important federal objective," which the Constitution does not allow.1
D.

PrimaryJurisdiction

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction may apply in situations where
"decision-making is divided between courts and administrative agencies."1 93
It is a doctrine of judicial deference 94 that "creates a workable relationship

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Id. at 559-60.
See id. at 561-62.
Id. at 573.
Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 604 (2011) (holding that federal law preempts

state law tort suits against manufacturers of generic drugs).

191. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011).
192. Zogenix, Inc. v. Patrick, No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 4273251, at *2 (D. Mass.
Aug. 28, 2014) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
193. Cheyney State Coll. Faculty v. Hufstedler, 703 F.2d 732, 736 (3d Cir. 1983).
194. Clark v. Time Warner Cable, 523 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2008). As a prudential
doctrine of deference, primary jurisdiction is distinct from preemption. Primary jurisdiction
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between the courts and administrative agencies ... . 195 In deferring to an
agency's primary jurisdiction, a court recognizes that judicial intrusion risks
introducing conflicting and inconsistent rulings, especially in areas requiring
special expertise, unique knowledge, or technical experience:
[I]n cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional
experience ofjudges or cases requiring the exercise of administrative
discretion, agencies created by Congress for regulating the subject
matter should not be passed over.... Uniformity and consistency in
the regulation of business entrusted to a particular agency are
secured, and the limited functions of review by the judiciary are more
rationally exercised, by preliminary resort for ascertaining and
interpreting the circumstances underlying legal issues to agencies
that are better equipped than courts by specialization, by insight
gained through experience, and by more flexible procedure.1 96
Courts apply a four-factor test to determine whether the doctrine applies:
(1) whether the question at issue is within the conventional
experience of judges or whether it involves technical or policy
considerations within the agency's particular field of expertise; (2)
whether the question at issue is particularly within the agency's
discretion; (3) whether there exists a substantial danger of
inconsistent rulings; and (4) whether a prior application to the agency
97
has been made.1

counsels that, where the legislature has tasked a particular body with overseeing a specific
sphere, courts should decline to exercise their jurisdiction in that sphere. See id. at 1115.
Preemption, in contrast, neither prevents nor counsels against a court entering an arena. Rather,
preemption principles guide the court in determining whether state or federal laws apply in that
arena. See Zogenix, 2014 WL 1454696, at *1.
195. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc., 71 F.3d 1086, 1105 (3d Cir. 1995)
(quoting Elkin v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 420 A.2d 371, 376 (Pa. 1980)).
196. Clark v. Actavis Grp. HF, 567 F. Supp. 2d 711, 714-15 (D.N.J. 2008) (quoting IPCO
Safety Corp. v. WorldCom, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 352, 355 (D.N.J. 1996)); see Jennifer L.
Pomeranz, Litigation to Address Misleading Food Label Claims and the Role of the State
Attorneys General, 26 REGENT U. L. REv. 421, 429-30 (2014) (citing Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374
U.S. at 353) ("This occurs when a court determines that Congress delegated the determination
of an area of law to a regulatory agency and the court is faced with a novel or particularly
complicated issue. In this context, a court might determine that the FDA has primary jurisdiction
over the issue and that the court should abstain from deciding the case in order to protect the
'integrity of a regulatory scheme."').
197. Clark, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 715 (citing IPCO Safety Corp., 944 F. Supp. at 356).
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The Supreme Court has recognized that public nuisance suits may intrude
on an agency's primary jurisdiction because such suits require a "complex
balancing"-i.e., weighing the utility of defendants' conduct against the
alleged harm that cannot be undertaken by courts because "Congress
designated an expert agency . .. as best suited to serve as primary regulator"
of the relevant subject matter.1 98 Numerous cases illustrate the ongoing
vitality of the primary jurisdiction doctrine in the context of drug and device
litigation.1 99 Similarly, many other cases, though not explicitly relying on the
primary jurisdiction doctrine, demonstrate the federal government has the
exclusive authority to enforce violations of federal drug labeling laws. 200
Clearly, the regulation of medication-including opioid painkillers-is
within the primary jurisdiction of the FDA, as duly-appointed by Congress.
Therefore, courts should defer to the legislature and the FDA when it comes
to issues related to the manufacture and distribution of such medications,
rather than attempting to tackle the issues themselves through indirect public
nuisance claims.

198. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 427-28 (2011).
199. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Sun Pharm. Indus. Ltd., No. 09-11726, 2010 WL 746394, at *4
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2010) ("[I]t is solely the FDA's duty to investigate and prosecute allegations
of misbranding or adulterating drugs."); In re Human Tissue Prods. Liab. Litig., 488 F. Supp.
2d 430, 432 (D.N.J. 2007) ("[W]hen an activity is arguably subject to an administrative agency's
expertise . . .federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of that agency.");
Healthpoint, Ltd. v. Stratus Pharm., Inc., 273 F. Supp. 2d 769, 787 (W.D. Tex. 2001)
("[A]rguments concerning what federal law does or does not require for [a product] to be
marketed legally require the direct application and interpretation of FDA regulations" and are
thus improper for judicial determination); Bernhardt v. Pfizer, Inc., Nos. 00 Civ. 4042 LMM, 00
Civ. 4379 LMM, 2000 WL 1738645, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2000) (noting that in matters
such as the weight to be afforded to scientific studies, "[t]he FDA, not this Court, has the relevant
expertise.") (citing Henley v. FDA, 77 F.3d 616, 621 (2d Cir. 1996)); Braintree Labs., Inc. v.
Nephro-Tech, Inc., No. 96-2459-JWL, 1997 WL 94237, at *6 (D. Kan. Feb. 26, 1997)
("[C]1aims that require direct interpretation and application of the FDCA are not properly
recognized because such matters are more appropriately addressed by the FDA.").
200. See, e.g., Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods. v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 586 F.3d 500,
510 (7th Cir. 2009); Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1993); Sandoz
Pharm. Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d 222, 231 (3d Cir. 1990); Mut. Pharm. Co. v.
Watson Pharm., Inc., No. CV 09-5700 PA (RCx), 2009 WL 3401117, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19,
2009) ("Plaintiffs' contentions concerning the product labels and inserts are even
weaker . . .because disputes concerning the content of those labels and inserts falls even more
squarely within the primary jurisdiction of the FDA."); Pediamed Pharm., Inc. v. Brekenridge
Pharm., Inc., 419 F. Supp. 2d 715, 727 (D. Md. 2006); Healthpoint, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 787.
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Difficulty of Establishing and Calculating Damages that are
Traceable to and Proximately Caused by Defendants' Lawful
Conduct or Products

Courts are authorized to hear and decide cases and controversies, which
presupposes and requires the presence of a plaintiff who has suffered a
concrete and particularized injury (e.g., a real and measurable harm), as
opposed to merely an abstract, hypothetical, or contingent injury. This
requirement poses a particular challenge to public nuisance suits in which the
harm to the municipality or county is either an anticipated future injury or is
merely the alleged increased cost of providing governmental services such as
policing, emergency medical care, and the like. Indeed, an inherent difficulty
in the latest iterations of public nuisance claims (e.g., municipal lawsuits
asserting claims arising from conduct or products that were already heavily
regulated, were in compliance with said regulations, and, in some instances,
had been expressly approved by the regulators) is finding any discrete and
measurable harm fairly traceable to the defendants' conduct. This challenge
arises both from the fact that numerous intervening actors and actions disrupt
the causal chain between the defendants' acts and the alleged harms and from
the difficulty of calculating a fiscal cost to the municipality attributable solely
and specifically to the challenged conduct or products.
Some governmental public nuisance plaintiffs have argued that a
corporation that makes a product causing severe harm should, on an almost
per se basis, be required to shoulder the costs of abating that harm.201 But such
an argument proves too much. As Judge Easterbrook explained in rejecting
the same argument made against the tobacco companies, there is "no rule of
law [that] requires persons whose acts cause harm to cover all of the costs,
unless these acts were legal wrongs."202 He further explained, even though
"[t]he food industry puts refined sugar in many products," foreseeably
resulting in "health problems and early death," plaintiffs cannot "recover in
tort from Godiva."

203

&

Rather, it is a well-settled rule of law that liability can only attach to "the
direct and immediate cause of the damage" alleged. 204 The New York
Appellate Division's First Department's opinion in People v. Sturm, Ruger
Co., upholding the dismissal of New York State's public nuisance claim

201. See, e.g., People ex rel. Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 309 A.D. 2d 91, 93 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2003).
202. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 734 Health & Welfare Tr. Fund v. Philip Morris Inc.,
196 F.3d 818, 823 (7th Cir. 1999).
203. Id.
204. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 309 A.D. 2d at 97.
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against gun manufacturers, is instructive on this point.20 5 When addressing
whether the state had sufficiently alleged facts to show proximate causation,
the court applied the "longstanding" principle that a cause of action cannot
stand "where the causal connection between the alleged business conduct and
harm is too tenuous and remote." 206 The court concluded that "the harm
plaintiff alleges is far too remote from defendants' otherwise lawful
commercial activity to fairly hold defendants accountable for common-law
public nuisance." 207 In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the New
York Court of Appeals' decision in Hamilton v. Beretta USA Corp., in which
the Court of Appeals unanimously declared that liability "should not be
imposed without a more tangible showing that defendants were a direct link
in the causal chain that resulted in plaintiffs' injuries, and that defendants were
realistically in a position to prevent the wrongs." 208 The First Department also
relied on the decisions of eight federal circuit courts of appeals directing
dismissal of similarly remote claims brought against tobacco companies. 209
The First Department recognized that "giving a green light" to the state's
public nuisance claim against gun manufacturers would "likely open the
courthouse doors to a flood of limitless, similar theories of public nuisance,
not only against these defendants, but also against a wide and varied array of
other commercial and manufacturing enterprises and activities."

210

The court

cautioned:
All a creative mind would need to do is construct a scenario
describing a known or perceived harm of a sort that can somehow be
said to relate back to the way a company or an industry makes,
markets and/or sells its nondefective, lawful product or service, and
21
a public nuisance claim would be conceived and a lawsuit born. 1

The court noted that, without strict adherence to the requirement that a
plaintiff establish proximate causation, "such lawsuits employed to address a
host of societal problems"-such as the opioid crisis would arise, regardless
of the remoteness of the alleged harm and the "nature and extent of any
intervening causes between defendants' lawful commercial conduct and the

205. See id. at 104, 106.
206. Id. at 95.
207. Id. at 103.
208. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1062 (N.Y. 2001); see Sturm,
Ruger & Co.,761 N.Y.S.2d at 195-97, 202.
209. See Sturm, Ruger & Co., 309 A.D. 2d at 103 n.3.
210. Id. at 96.
211. Id.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2019

39

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 3
556

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 70: 517

alleged harm." 212 In this way, the proximate cause requirement serves to assist
courts in avoiding involvement in "issues which the Legislative and Executive
branches are vastly better designed, equipped and funded to address." 213
Moreover, as the First Department recognized in People v. Sturm, Ruger
& Co., the practice of barring remote and indirect claims for lack of proximate
causation is not unique to New York state law, but rather has been utilized by
at least eight United States Courts of Appeals to uphold dismissal of similar
public nuisance claims against tobacco companies. 214
The same rationale applies in equal force to such claims against opioid
manufacturers. The lawful conduct of manufacturing and distributing legal,
FDA-approved opioid medications is far too remote from the harms suffered
by states and local governments as a result of the opioid crisis. Furthermore,
even if a court were willing to permit such remote claims against opioid
manufacturers and pharmaceutical companies, it is hard to imagine how states
and local governments will calculate the damages that are the proximate result
of the alleged conduct. 215 As one commenter recognized:

Governmental entities undoubtedly bear heavy costs in law
enforcement and medical treatment resulting from the opioid
epidemic. It seems more than a stretch, however, to claim that all of
the costs of law enforcement are related to illegal opioids, or that all
government-bome health care costs are opioid-related. After all,
there are other addicting drugs that might not follow from the use of
opioids, such as methamphetamine, barbiturates and benzodiazepines. 2 16

Therefore, proximate causation and establishment of damages poses yet
another roadblock in the use of such public nuisance litigation as a remedy for
the opioid-misuse epidemic.
F. Dormant Commerce Clause
There is no question that the imposition of civil liability and monetary
judgments are a powerful method of altering defendants' (and other similarly

212. Id.
213. Id. at 105.
214. See id. at 103 n.3.
215. See Richard Scruggs, Are Opioids the New Tobacco?, LAW360 (Sept. 15, 2017, 11:04
AM), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/962715.
216. Id.
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situated potential defendants') conduct. 217 Common-law tort claims
especially can force a defendant "to change its methods of doing
business . . . to avoid the threat of ongoing liability." 218 In short, a sizeable
state-law judgment (or settlement) is a potent tool to alter a defendant's outof-state conduct, and if multiple sizeable judgments (or settlements) are
awarded in multiple jurisdictions, there could be seismic changes to the
industry itself. Stated differently, such judgments and settlements affect
interstate commerce in significant ways.
The Constitution, however, forbids states and their political subdivisions
from regulating interstate commerce. Rather, the Commerce Clause grants
Congress the sole authority to regulate interstate commerce. 21 9 The Supreme
Court has inferred a "dormant" or "negative" Commerce Clause from this text,
finding that since Congress has the power to regulate interstate commerce,
states are precluded from doing so by enacting laws or regulations that
excessively burden interstate commerce.220 "The critical inquiry" in
determining whether a state regulation violates the Commerce Clause "is
whether the practical effect of the regulation is to control conduct beyond the
boundaries of the State." 22 1 A state statute violates the dormant Commerce

Clause in several ways: (1) if it "discriminates against interstate commerce in
favor of intrastate commerce, (2) if it imposes a burden on interstate
commerce incommensurate with the local benefits secured," or (3) if it has an
effect of "extraterritorial control of commerce occurring entirely outside the
boundaries of the state in question." 222

Though the foregoing authorities analyze the dormant commerce clause
in the context of state statutes, there can be no doubt that "[s]tate power may
be exercised as much by a jury's application of a state rule of law in a civil
lawsuit as by a statute," 223 and that "regulation can be . . . effectively exerted

217. See Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., 565 U.S. 625, 637 (2012) (quoting San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959)) ("[T]he obligation to pay
compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct.").
218. Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 495 (1987); see also Boomer v. Atl.
Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 873 (N.Y. 1970) ("[T]he risk of being required to pay permanent
damages . .

would itself be a reasonable effective spur" to change the defendant's conduct).

219. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
220. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986) (quoting Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers,
Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980)); see also Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336-37 (1989) ("[T]he
Commerce Clause protects against inconsistent legislation arising from the projection of one
state regulatory regime into the jurisdiction of another State.").

221. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336 (citing Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor
Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986)).
222. Grand River Enters. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, 425 F.3d 158, 168 (2d Cir. 2005)
(quoting Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205, 216 (2d Cir. 2004)).
223. BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 n.17 (1996).
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through an award of damages." 224 In the same way that the Commerce Clause
forecloses a disruptive patchwork of protectionist state statutes, so too it
forbids states from accomplishing the same piecemeal, variegated, and
inconsistent quilt of regulation by virtue of staggering judgments or
settlements that force the defendants to alter their conduct in all of the regions
they serve. 225
IV. LOCAL GOVERNMENT PUBLIC NUISANCE SUITS DISRUPT THE ABILITY OF
STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL TO BRING AND MANAGE LITIGATION
ARISING FROM THE SAME ALLEGED CONDUCT

In addition to the challenges discussed above, there are a number of
concerns that arise when a state or local government seeks to bring a public
nuisance claim against opioid manufacturers where the state Attorney
General's office has brought (or intends to bring) the same or similar claims.
First, as explained more fully below, such parallel suits raise issues regarding
Dillon's Rule, which might bar a local government or municipality from
bringing suit in the first place. Second, even if a municipality has authority to
bring its claims, there is the potential issue of double recovery and double or
multiple liability. Thus, if these claims are to be brought at all, they should be
left to the states through their Attorneys General and not to whims and diverse
interests of local governments.
First, bringing public nuisance lawsuits of this kind may be beyond the
scope of a municipality's authority in violation of Dillon's Rule. Dillon's Rule
is a:
common law canon of statutory construction propagated by Iowa
Supreme Court Justice John F. Dillon over 100 years ago, stands for
the principle that local governments possess and can exercise only
(1) powers granted in express words; (2) powers necessarily or fairly
implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; and (3) powers

224. Kurns v. R.R. Friction Prods. Corp., 565 U.S. 625, 637 (2012) (quoting San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959).
225. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 571, 585 (stating a State may not use its tort law to "impos[e]
its regulatory policies on the entire [n]ation," because "one State's power to impose burdens on
the interstate market" is "constrained by the need to respect the interests of other States"); Am.
Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Cahill, 152 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 1998) (reasoning that air pollution is
uniformly regulated by the EPA "in recognition of the burden on commerce that would result
from allowing other states to set their own individual emission standards"); North Carolina ex
rel Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 301 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting nuisance law is illsuited to national climate policy).
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essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes
of the entity not simply convenient, but indispensable. 226
The extent Dillon's rule applies varies throughout the country. Forty-four
jurisdictions have enacted some form of Home Rule, which curtails the
applicability of the common law Dillon's Rule depending on the degree of
local autonomy granted.227 Thirty-six of the Home Rule jurisdictions adopted
it via a constitutional amendment, while the other eight adopted Home Rule
via legislative enactment. 228 Thirty-one jurisdictions are hybrid Home
Rule/Dillon's Rule jurisdictions that apply Dillon's Rule to matters or
governmental units not accounted for in the constitutional amendment/statute
which grants Home Rule. 229 Other states, such as South Carolina, however,
treat the enactment of Home Rule as a complete abolition of the applicability
of Dillon's Rule. 230

Nevertheless, regardless of "[w]hether a local government is governed by
the Dillon Rule or Home Rule, the ultimate decision of what powers they
possess resides with the states." 23 1A "local government is strictly limited to
what the state delegates to it," and "it is unfounded for local jurisdictions to
contend they are equal to the states."

232

Therefore, absent an express

designation of authority by a state to its local subdivisions or municipalities
granting the right and responsibility to regulate and control the availability
and distribution of opioid medications, any lawsuit effectively seeking to
enforce or implement such local regulation through use of public nuisance
claims constitutes a violation of Dillon's Rule and state sovereignty. 233

226. Shorts v. Bartholomew, 278 S.W.3d 268, 276 (Tenn. 2009); see also BellSouth
Telecomms. v. City of Laurinburg, 606 S.E.2d 721, 725 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (citing
Homebuilders Ass'n of Charlotte v. City of Charlotte, 442 S.E.2d 45, 49-50 (N.C. 1994)) ("In
its reading of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-4, the [Supreme] Court found that the narrow rule of
construction established over some 100 years prior by common law, known as 'Dillon's Rule,'
had been replaced by the legislature's 1971 enactment.").
227. See HONORABLE JON D. RUSSELL & AARON BOSTROM, AMERICAN CITY COUNTY
EXCHANGE, FEDERALISM, DILLON RULE AND HOME RULE 6 (2016), https://www.alec.org/

app/uploads/2016/01/2016-ACCE-White-Paper-Dillon-House-Rule-Final.pdf.
228. Id.
229. See id. at 8.
230. See, e.g., Williams v. Town of Hilton Head Island, S.C., 311 S.C. 417, 421-22, 429
S.E.2d 802, 804-05 (1993).
231. RUSSELL & BOSTROM, supra note 227, at 1.

232. Id. at 2, 3.
233. Indeed, the defendants in one of the suits centralized in the M.D.L. have already
argued that a county in Ohio lacks standing to bring a complaint because the Ohio Attorney
General who is the only one authorized to "bring claims over a statewide public health
crisis" has already initiated such an action. Jeff Overley & Emily Field, Drug Cos. Unleash
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Additionally, the use of public nuisance litigation by state subdivisions
and localities raises an issue of potential double recovery against opioid
manufacturers and distributors. 23 4 Pursuant to the rule against double
recovery, "[a] plaintiff may not receive a double recovery for the same injuries
or losses arising from the same conduct or wrong." 23 5 In other words, a double
recovery exists when there is "an overlap between: (1) the injuries or damages
for which a plaintiff has received compensation; and (2) the injuries or
damages that are the subject of a plaintiff s claim against the defendant." 23 6
In this case, because state Attorneys General can bring their claims on
behalf of all state residents, that necessarily includes residents of all state
subdivisions and municipalities. 23 7 Accordingly, if both a state's Attorney
General and its municipalities file public nuisance claims against
pharmaceutical companies-suing for essentially the same wrongdoing and
for similar harms on behalf of the same state residents-then any recovery by
the municipalities would necessarily be entirely duplicative of at least part of
a judgment in favor of the Attorney General. Not only would recovery by state
subdivisions under those circumstances violate the rule against double
recovery, but it would also "violate that sense of 'fundamental fairness' which
lies at the heart of constitutional due process." 238
Therefore, actions by local state governments bringing the same claims
based on similar allegations against the same or similar defendants as those
brought by the state Attorneys General are not only redundant, but also risk
unnecessarily impeding the claims brought by the state Attorneys General.

Opioid MDL Counterattacks,LAW360 (June 11, 2018, 8:46 PM), https://www.law
360.com/articles/1016049/drug-cos-unleash-opioid-mdl-counterattacks (discussing County of
Summit v. Purdue Pharma LP, No. 1: 1 8 -op- 4 5 0 9 0 (N.D. Ohio)).
234. See Michael J. Purcell, Note, Settling High: A Common Law Public Nuisance
Response to the OpioidEpidemic, 52 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 135, 136 n.4 (2018) (noting
that lawsuits brought by municipalities and local governments "may create issues regarding
double-recovery" where the state Attorney Generals have already filed suit).
235. 22 AM. JuR. 2D Damages § 32 (2018).
236. Id.
237. See Susan Harriman, Note, ParensPatriaeActions on Behalf ofIndirect Purchasers:
Do They Survive Illinois Brick?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 179, 194 (1982).
238. Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1053, 1063 (D.N.J. 1989), rev'd on
other grounds, 900 F.2d 686 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting In re N. Dist. Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD
Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 899 (N.D Cal. 1981)).
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PUBLIC NUISANCE SUITS BROUGHT BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
ADVERSELY AFFECT THE FUNCTIONING OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM

Apart from the various doctrinal barriers and practical dangers of
municipal public nuisance suits discussed above, the expanding use of public
nuisance litigation as a policy-making tool subverts the equitable
administration of justice. Such suits consume considerable judicial resources,
all for what some have opined are merely attempts to force lucrative
settlements by ginning up sufficient public outrage by the filing of lawsuits
regardless of the presence of any legally cognizable wrongdoing.23 9 Though
this tactic has in the past proven "successful," it runs roughshod over the rule
of law and the equitable administration of justice:
The natural impulse to want to help a severely injured victim or
remediate extensive environmental damage is certainly understandable. Courts, though, must be grounded by the rule of law. Legal
doctrines such as negligent misrepresentation, public nuisance,
vicarious liability, and products liability all have elements that must
be proved based on credible facts and sound scientific analysis.
Courts must refrain from becoming mere compensation mechanisms
for transferring money from businesses to injured people. Rather,
they must remain places where justice can be achieved and where
businesses are only required to pay victims that they wrongfully
injured or to clean up environmental harms that they wrongfully
caused. Liability rules must remain based on sound principles of law,
240
not deep pocket jurisprudence.
Furthermore, this instinct and the manner in which such suits are
prosecuted gives rise to a very real risk that a judge or jury in a state court
public nuisance suit will wrongly penalize the defendants for conduct
occurring outside the jurisdiction. 24 1 In addition, the generalized claims-

239. See Schwartz, Goldberg & Appel, supra note 59, at 387 (quoting law professors and
commentators opining that "the success of the opioid cases will depend upon whether the
plaintiffs can muster sufficient legal, political and public relations pressure to force a
settlement," the "publicity generated by the lawsuits, regardless of the suits' legal merit, is 'a
great way to get information into the public domain,"' and the litigation is "'more of a publicity
stunt').
240. Id. at 404.
241. See BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572-73 (1996) ("Alabama does not have
the power, however, to punish BMW for conduct that was lawful where it occurred and that had
no impact on Alabama or its residents. Nor may Alabama impose sanctions on BMW in order
to deter conduct that is lawful in other jurisdictions.").
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untethered from specific legal wrongdoing that is traceable to calculable
damages-in the evolving breed of public nuisance suits complicate the
allocation of liability and damages. 242
There are also disputes about how to handle discovery in the hundreds of
parallel lawsuits. In South Carolina, for example, all opioid cases-including
those brought by local governments and the suit brought by the Attorney
General have been assigned to a single judge. 243 Even in that somewhat
centralized approach, different cities' and counties' attorneys will each wish
to issue their own document requests and conduct their own depositions. This
duplication is magnified by the fact that scores of other lawsuits are pending
in scores of other states, which are themselves overshadowed by the hundreds
of suits centralized in the federal Multi-District Litigation proceeding. The
MDL court itself has noted the difficulties, duplication, and drain on resources
of attempting to coordinate the MDL discovery and trial process with the
pending cases in state courts. 244

Moreover, given this profusion of parallel lawsuits across the country, it
is highly unlikely that these cases will all reach trial at the same time. Rather,
there is a very real risk that one stand-alone case might go to trial firstwithout waiting for the MDL processes to play out and return a verdict that
will significantly impact the rest of the pending actions. For example, if the
jury were to return an exorbitant, outlier verdict against defendants, the opioid
manufacturers and distributors might be highly motivated to seek settlement,
regardless of the merits of the claims against them, out of fear of being slapped
with a similar judgment. This also creates the potential for the establishment
and implementation of myriad new rules and regulations-either through
settlement or court judgments governing the manufacturing and distribution
of opioid medications, varying from state to state and, potentially, even town
to town, with which these defendants will have to comply. Such a system does
not further the equitable administration of justice.

242. See Scruggs, supra note 215 (arguing in part that one "uncertainty is whether all
potentially liable opioid defendants have been joined in the suits" and that "the lack of
uniformity" in the defendants named or not named in the various lawsuits "creates the potential
for 'empty chair' defenses where the missing defendant gets blamed by the others for causing
the problem").
243. See Amended Order, In re Opioid Litigation, No. 2018-08-23-01 (Aug. 23, 2018).
244. See Protocol for State & Federal Court Coordination at 1-2, In re Nat'l Prescription
Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-md-02804-DAP (Oct. 9, 2018).
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VI. CONCLUSION

The expansion of governmental public nuisance claims beyond their
traditional bounds runs headlong into a number of well-established judicial
doctrines. Such claims inject courts and litigants into what is, at bottom, a
democratic policy-making decision that courts and litigants are ill-suited to
make. In addition, such suits disrupt Attorneys Generals' actions arising from
the same conduct or products, and ironically, hamper the equitable
administration of justice.
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